Foreign assistance and its impact on civil-military relations: a case study of federal democratic Republic of Nepal by Chand, Bobby
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2014-03
Foreign assistance and its impact on civil-military
relations: a case study of federal democratic
Republic of Nepal
Chand, Bobby














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND ITS IMPACT ON CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF FEDERAL 








Thesis Advisor:  Anshu N. Chatterjee 
Co-Advisor: Cristiana Matei 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2014 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND ITS IMPACT ON CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF 
NEPAL 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Bobby Chand 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
As Nepal went through a sea of political changes since 1990, civil-military relations (CMR) also came into the limelight. Nepal’s 
democratic CMR can be understood best by dividing it into two distinct time periods, from 1990 to 2005 and from 2006 to 2012. 
The first period illustrates Nepal’s practice of multiparty democracy with a constitutional monarchy, and the second period 
represents the transition into a republic with a multiparty democracy. In both periods, despite constitutional provisions to bring the 
Nepalese Army under civilian control, the military has prevailed over the civilian government whenever there was friction in civil-
military relations.  
In addition to the domestic interplay, the divergent foreign assistance—guided mainly by the donor’s geo-strategic and 
political interests—has complicated Nepal’s civil-military relations. Given Nepal’s geo-strategic location, it receives significant 
amounts of foreign assistance from both its neighbors India and China, and from the world superpower, the U.S. While foreign 
assistance benefits many programs in Nepal, it can also affect the dynamics of CMR as various political parties and the military 
have long-established relations with these external powers. This research studies the impact of foreign assistance on the CMR by 







14. SUBJECT TERMS Civil-Military Relations, democratization, democratic civilian control, 
Nepalese Army, foreign assistance, military assistance, effectiveness, donor countries, republic, 
monarchy, political parties, civilian leadership, military leadership, India, China, U.S. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
91 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND ITS IMPACT ON CIVIL-MILITARY 





Lieutenant Colonel, Nepalese Army 
M.A., Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, 2008 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























Mohammed M. Hafez, Ph.D. 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv




As Nepal went through a sea of political changes since 1990, civil-military relations 
(CMR) also came into the limelight. Nepal’s democratic CMR can be understood best by 
dividing it into two distinct time periods, from 1990 to 2005 and from 2006 to 2012. The 
first period illustrates Nepal’s practice of multiparty democracy with a constitutional 
monarchy, and the second period represents the transition into a republic with a 
multiparty democracy. In both periods, despite constitutional provisions to bring the 
Nepalese Army under civilian control, the military has prevailed over the civilian 
government whenever there was friction in civil-military relations.  
In addition to the domestic interplay, the divergent foreign assistance—guided 
mainly by the donor’s geo-strategic and political interests—has complicated Nepal’s 
civil-military relations. Given Nepal’s geo-strategic location, it receives significant 
amounts of foreign assistance from both its neighbors India and China, and from the 
world superpower, the U.S. While foreign assistance benefits many programs in Nepal, it 
can also affect the dynamics of CMR as various political parties and the military have 
long-established relations with these external powers. This research studies the impact of 
foreign assistance on the CMR by analyzing various types of assistance provided by 
India, China, and U.S., and their motives behind rendering the assistance.   
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................1 
A.  INTRODUCTION............................................................................................1 
B.  IMPORTANCE ................................................................................................2 
C.  PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES ...............................................................3 
D.  LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................3 
1.  Theoretical Aspects of Civil-Military Relations ................................4 
2.  Understanding Civil-Military Relations in Nepal and Foreign 
Security Assistance...............................................................................7 
E.  METHODS AND SOURCES ........................................................................12 
F.  THESIS OVERVIEW ...................................................................................13 
II.  FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO NEPAL ...................................................................15 
A.  INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................15 
B.  OVERVIEW OF INDO-NEPAL RELATIONS .........................................16 
1.  Indian Interest in Nepal.....................................................................20 
2.  Indian Assistance to Nepal (1990‒2005) ..........................................22 
3.  Indian Assistance to Nepal (2006‒2012) ..........................................24 
C.  OVERVIEW OF SINO-NEPAL RELATIONS ..........................................25 
1.  Chinese Interest in Nepal ..................................................................26 
2.  Chinese Assistance to Nepal (1990‒2005) ........................................28 
3.  Chinese Assistance to Nepal (2006-2012) .........................................30 
D.  OVERVIEW OF U.S.-NEPAL RELATIONS .............................................31 
1.  U.S. Interest in Nepal .........................................................................33 
2.  U.S. Assistance to Nepal (1990‒2005) ...............................................34 
3.  U.S. Assistance to Nepal (2006‒2012) ...............................................36 
E.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................36 
III.  DYNAMICS OF DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN 
NEPAL ........................................................................................................................39 
A.  INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................39 
B.  BACKGROUND OF THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN 
NEPAL ............................................................................................................40 
C.  CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (1990‒2005)..........................................42 
1.  Transition to Multiparty Democracy: Army Reluctant To 
Accept Civilian Control .....................................................................42 
2.  The Legal and Constitutional Framework for CMR......................43 
3.  The Civil-Military Gap ......................................................................44 
4.  Legislative Control Measures ...........................................................45 
5.  Maoist Insurgency and the Beginning of Civil-Military 
Friction: Effectiveness of the Neglected Military ............................46 
6.  Executive Control Mechanism ..........................................................47 
7.  Royal Takeover 2005: Worsening CMR ..........................................48 
 viii
D.  ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ON 
CMR (1990‒2005) ..........................................................................................48 
E.  CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (2006‒2012): CONTINUED 
INSTABILITY ...............................................................................................51 
1.  The Transition to a Democratic Republic .......................................51 
2.  Extra-Constitutional Control Mechanism: The Media’s Power ...52 
3.  Executive Control Measures: The Civilian Supremacy .................53 
4.  Legislative Control .............................................................................54 
5.  Judicial Control Mechanism: Judicial Review of Military 
Activities..............................................................................................55 
6.  Maoist-Led Government: Nadir of CMR ........................................55 
7.  Ministry of Defense: Weak Institution .............................................57 
8.  Integration of Maoist Combatants:  Stabilizing CMR ...................58 
F.  ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ON 
CMR (2006‒2012) ..........................................................................................59 
G.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................61 
IV.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....................................................63 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................69 




LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CA Constituent Assembly 
C-in-C Commander in Chief 
CMR Civil-Military Relations 
COAS Chief of the Army Staff 
CPN Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) 
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
E-IMET Expanded International Military Education and Training 
IHL International Humanitarian Law 
IHRL International Human Rights Law 
IMET International Military Education and Training 
MOD Ministry of Defense 
NA Nepalese Army 
NDC National Defense Council 
NIPS Nepal Institute for Policy Studies 
NSC National Security Council 
PAC Public Account Committee 
PLA People’s Liberation Army 
SPA Seven Party Alliance 
  
 x




I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my thesis advisor, Professor 
Anshu N. Chatterjee, for her perseverance in guiding me towards the completion of this 
work. Without her personal guidance, this thesis would not have reached its final level of 
excellence. I would also like to offer my special thanks to my thesis co-advisor, Professor 
Cristiana Matei, without whose assistance and encouragement, completion of this thesis 
would have been very difficult. 
I am grateful to my son, Bardaan (Danny), for his sacrifice and cooperation while 
I spent long hours in the library. Finally, I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to 
my beloved wife, Reena, for her dedication, compassion, and support throughout my time 
at NPS.  
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Nepal has undergone tremendous political change over the past two decades. In 
1990, the government began its transition from a party-less autocratic Panchayat system 
with an absolute monarchy to a multiparty democracy with a constitutional monarchy. 
During this consolidation phase, Nepal saw a decade long Maoist insurgency leading to a 
royal takeover in 2005, which then produced an anti-monarchy alliance between agitating 
democratic parties and the Maoists. Finally, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 
signed on November 2006, successfully ended the monarchy and the violent insurgency 
in the country simultaneously, and the first meeting of a newly elected Constituent 
Assembly (CA) declared Nepal a Federal Democratic Republic in 2008.1   
As Nepal transitions into a democratic system, Civil-Military Relations (CMR) 
increasingly comes into focus. Historically, the military was under the supervision of the 
monarchy, so its transition to civil authority is an essential but tense issue. Interestingly, 
the transition to democracy since the signing of the CPA has undermined many of 
Nepal’s traditional institutions; however, the Nepalese Army (NA) remains a stable 
national institution.2 The NA’s decision to respect the CA by not aligning with the king 
during this transition to democracy phase indicates that the NA accepts the aspiration of 
the people for change and is willing to work with the civil authorities.3 With the abolition 
of the monarchy in 2008, the army began to deal directly with the political parties as the 
                                                 
1 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was a result of long and often difficult negotiations 
between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and CPN (Maoists). When it was finally signed in November 2006 
in Kathmandu by all the SPA leaders, it officially signaled the end of the ten-year long Maoist conflict. 
Through this agreement, the SPA and Maoists committed themselves to a peace process that would not 
only end the Maoist conflict but also lay out a road map for elections to a Constituent Assembly that would 
restructure Nepal along more democratic and inclusive lines. See, Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
concluded between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 
http://un.org.np/node/10498; The Freedom House Index of 2013 says Nepal is partly free. 
2 Ivan Campbell, “Nepal Case Study,” in China and Conflict-Affected States: Between Principle and 
Pragmatism (2012), 7, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/FAB%20Nepal.pdf. 




military came under democratic civilian control and thus the focus on CMR intensified.4  
In spite of provisions for civilian control of the military in the interim Constitution of 
2007, Nepal continues to struggle with stabilizing its CMR, partly because the civilian 
consolidation has yet to occur at the center.  
The complexity of Nepal’s recent political change is reflected in the number and 
type of players involved in the process of stabilizing the country; the political outcome 
was due to four main players: the Maoists, the mainstream democratic political parties, 
the King, and the international community. The international community mainly 
comprises India, the West (including the U.S., U.K., and EU), the United Nations, and 
China.5 As the major donors of security assistance, India, China, and the U.S. especially 
influenced the transition process in Nepal.6 The NA, in particular, receives substantial 
military aid from foreign donors. With the presence of various external competing 
players in the transitioning process, this thesis then focuses on the important question: 
what is the impact of competing foreign security assistance on the CMR of Nepal? This 
research will make an important contribution to the theory of CMR by examining the 
impact of foreign influence in democratizing developing countries. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
Nepal’s civil-military relations, at this crucial phase, present an opportunity to 
study the impact of diverse and competing foreign security assistance upon the 
developing civil-military institutions of a country. In a world where major powers try to 
carve out areas of interest, such an analysis will help expand our knowledge of how 
various, and at times competing, international players can shape a country’s institutional 
                                                 
4 “Discourses of Civil-Military Relations in Nepal,” Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, Policy Paper 7 
(2012): 12, http://www.nipsnepal.org/pictures/publication/L59CivilMilitary 
_relations_in_Nepal19_March_2012.pdf.   
5 S. D. Muni, “Bringing the Maoists Down From the Hills,” in Nepal in Transition: From People’s 
War to Fragile Peace, ed. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 313, 316. 
6 India has agreed to supply military stores and equipment worth $20 million, see “Fact Sheet: India-
Nepal Partnership,” July 9, 2013, www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/21920; Utpal Parashar, “China 
Doles out $19.8 Million in Military Aid to Nepal,” Hindustan Times, March 24, 2011, 
www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print/677053.aspx; “United States Spent $3.5 Million under IMET 
Program in 2011,” see www.state.gov/documents/organization/197607.pdf.  
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development. Such a contribution can improve policies on foreign aid for the developing 
democracies as well as the international community.  
While substantial research exists on CMR in democratizing countries, and some 
on various types of security assistance to democratization, there are limited analyses on 
the impact of competing foreign security assistance on civil-military relations in 
emerging democracies during a globalizing age. This thesis strives to contribute to that 
effort.   
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
How do civil and military institutions reconcile after a period of upheaval when 
the military’s priorities are also influenced by external forces? Nepal’s political setting 
presents an example wherein political and military institutions have deep relations with 
external players. More prominently, since the beginning of the Maoist insurgency Nepal 
became a strategic factor for the U.S. Consequently, the U.S. started a deeper engagement 
in Nepalese politics.7 Increased involvement of such extra-regional powers prompted its 
neighbors, India and China, to enhance their security and economic assistance to Nepal. 
Scholars also equally acknowledged that all of the donor countries have divergent 
interests in assisting the NA.8 This diversity of interest may have unintended 
consequences. Two hypotheses shape this research:  
1. The diverse foreign security assistance causes complexities in the civil-
military relations, as the military becomes more powerful in relation to 
other traditional institutions. 
2. The very diversity of the foreign security assistance may provide stability 
in civil-military relations even under unstable political conditions.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to assess the impact of foreign security assistance on the CMR of Nepal, 
it is important to study literature on CMR and Nepal’s foreign relations, because foreign 
assistance has deeply shaped the military’s strength in Nepal. Yet, there is a limited 
                                                 
7 Nihar Nayak, “Involvement of Major Powers in Nepal since the 1990s: Implications for India,” 
Strategic Analysis 33, no. 1 (2009): 41, doi:10.1080/09700160802518551.    
8 Ibid. 
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literature on civil-military relations in Nepal. Moreover, literature on the role of foreign 
players on civil-military relations is virtually non-existent despite the fact that the 
military gets large amounts of assistance from players. While there is a substantial 
amount of literature on security assistance to Nepal, these studies seldom discuss the 
impact of such assistance specifically on civil-military relations in a democratizing 
setting. Most of the available literature views civil-military relations as an outcome of 
domestic political interplay, and they rarely mention the role of foreign support in 
shaping the behavior of military and civilian leaders. This thesis will help bridge that gap. 
First, this thesis will review the available literature on theories of democratic civilian 
control and effectiveness, dynamics of civil-military relations in Nepal, and foreign 
security assistance. 
1. Theoretical Aspects of Civil-Military Relations 
According to Samuel P. Huntington, an eminent civil military scholar, like any 
other professional institution, the military has to demonstrate expertise, responsibility to 
society, and a distinct corporate character. The professional military thus has to exhibit 
expertise to manage violence, the responsibility to provide security to society, and a set of 
distinct ethos and values that make up its corporate character. He argues that the best way 
to maximize military professionalism is through adoption of the “objective civilian 
control” mechanisms.9 Definitions of military professionalism may vary with time and 
context. Perhaps the most contemporary definition of military professionalism, in the 
context of civil-military relations, is defined by Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and 
Andrew Cottey. According to them, professional soldiers “accept that their role is to 
fulfill the demands of the civilian government of the state and are capable of undertaking 
military activities in an effective and efficient way, and whose organization and internal 
structures reflect these assumptions.10 
                                                 
9 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Harvard, 1957), 83. 
10 Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey, “Introduction: The Professionalization of 
Armed Forces in Postcommunist Europe,” in The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: 
Building Professional Armed Forces, ed. Forster, Edmunds, and Cottey (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2002), 
6. 
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The concept of objective civilian control demands that the military be given 
complete autonomy to manage violence, so that the military is not involved in politics 
and can focus on its mission of providing security to the society. Here the focus is on 
militarization of the military. “Subjective civilian control,” on the other hand, achieves 
the goal of civilian control by maximizing civilian power through various democratic 
institutions such as a constitution, an executive body, a parliament, and an oversight 
mechanism such as budgetary control.11 Huntington’s theories of civilian control are 
more useful to understand CMR in advanced democracies because his theories are 
explaining a process in civilian consolidation regions. In the democratizing countries 
where democratic institutions are yet to mature, such theories do not suffice to explain 
the complexities of CMR. For instance, Nepal is implementing civilian control of the 
military along with the civilian consolidation in a post-civil war framework. Thus, this 
study will analyze the specific factors associated with the civilian leadership and the 
army in Nepal in order to understand CMR development in transitioning developing 
countries 
Morris Janowitz, propagates a sociological approach for the professionalization of 
the military. Contrary to Huntington, he argues that civilian control is best achieved 
through civilianization of the military. He specifically values the broader influences of 
society on the military culture. He recommends that, as the military democratizes, people 
from all walks of life can join the officer corps, making it more inclusive and mirroring 
the society they serve, which will in turn motivate the military to work for the best 
interest of their society.12 The study of Janowitz’s sociological approach is useful to 
understand why at times NA is perceived as working against the interest of the society, 
because historically military leadership came from only a certain elite class of people, 
and thus the common people lacked the ownership of the military. Janowitz does not 
explain the role of external powers in democratizing the military or its impact on the 
professionalism and military culture. Thus, this thesis will analyze the influence of the 
external forces on the behavior of both the civilian and the military leadership in Nepal. 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 80. 
12 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1971), 427. 
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The military is said to be under civilian control when all decisions of government, 
including security affairs are made by the civilian officials of the regime outside the 
military.13 The essence of civilian control is to make the military subordinate to the 
society it serves, and not the reverse. Richard H. Kohn sheds light on the importance of 
civilian control in democratic regime through the following statement, “While a country 
may have civilian control of the military without democracy, it cannot have democracy 
without civilian control.”14 Democracy from a minimalist point of view has many 
elements, and one of them is civilian control of the military. Many scholars, such as Kohn 
and Karen Guttieri highlight the importance of civilian control, but remain silent on the 
significance of the effectiveness of the military, which is at the heart of understanding 
CMR.15 One of the causes of friction in democratic civil-military relations is best 
explained by a new phenomenon that “the empowering of civilian political leaders, who 
often have little or no background on security issues and may be suspicious of the armed 
forces, is likely to alter the ways states approach security issues.”16 Building upon the 
core notion of these various literatures, one can conclude that an enhanced effectiveness 
of the armed forces is essential for a sound CMR. Thomas Bruneau and Florina Cristiana 
Matei contend that the sole focus on democratic control of the military is insufficient to 
explain the democratic CMR. Hence, they propose a new concept of civil-military 
relations within the framework of a trinity:  1) “democratic civilian control of the security 
forces,” 2) “effectiveness of the security forces in fulfilling their assigned roles,” and 3) 
“their efficiency, that is, fulfilling the assigned roles and missions at a minimum cost.”17 
                                                 
13 Richard H. Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” Journal of Democracy 8, no. 2 (1997): 
2. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Karen Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” in Who Guards the Guardians 
and How, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 236. 
16 Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, “International Democracy Promotion and Its Impact on 
Civil-Military Relations,” in Global Politics of Defense Reform, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Harold 
Trinkunas (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 50.  
17 See Florina Cristiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” in The 
Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei 
(London: Routledge, 2013), 26. However, Bruneau argues in Chapter 4 of the same book that “the concept 
of efficiency in the use of resources for national security and defense is at best misleading, a ‘red herring.’” 
Thus, because efficiency is difficult to measure, I will consider civil-military relations conceptualized only 
by democratic civilian control and effectiveness.  
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Bruneau and Matei assert that the new concept is relevant to contemporary multi-faceted 
and network-like security challenges and equally applicable to both developing as well as 
consolidated democracies. How is it relevant to CMR though?  
The previously mentioned theories provide a theoretical framework for 
considering the important issues surrounding civilian control of the defense forces, 
including its effectiveness, but they lack an explanation or an understanding of external 
forces that shape the issues cited. Nepal, meanwhile, because of its location and 
democratization during the era of the War on Terror, is deeply affected by external 
players. According to Tom Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, there is almost no systematic 
assessment of the impacts made by the external actors in shaping CMR, and there is 
virtually no literature that explains the impact of foreign programs and relationships on 
CMR.18 Thus, in order to analyze the case of Nepal, there is a need to study the literature 
on evolving indigenous CMR and foreign security assistance rendered to it. 
2. Understanding Civil-Military Relations in Nepal and Foreign Security 
Assistance 
Dhruba Kumar, a prominent Nepalese political scientist, argues that despite 
grudges against the monarch, the democratic political parties did very little to weaken the 
military-monarch relationship in the Constitution of 1990. According to him, absence of 
functional democratic institutions, lack of interest and knowledge of security affairs, and 
a legacy of deep monarch-military relations were the main causes of Nepal’s failure to 
achieve democratic control of security forces from 1990.19 Although Kumar identifies the 
lapses pertaining to CMR in the post 1990, he does not explain why such lapses remained 
a problem. This thesis will attempt to analyze the role of external power in the outcome 
of CMR during the period.  
Bringing the NA under the civilian control was one of the main political 
requirements when the Parliament was reinstated in 2006. Hence, an interim Constitution 
                                                 
18 Bruneau and Trinkunas, “International Democracy Promotion,” 56‒58. 
19 Dhruba Kumar, “Democratic Control of Security Forces,” in Changing Security Dynamics in Nepal, 
ed. Rajan Bhattarai and Rosy Cave (London: Saferworld, 2009), 136, 140, 
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/ChangingSecurityDynamicsOfNepal_english.pdf.  
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of 2007 made special provisions to bring NA under absolute control of the civilian 
authority. A policy paper presented by the Nepal Institute for Policy Studies (NIPS) 
affirms that the interim constitution compelled the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) to 
pledge allegiance to the principle of civilian control over the armed forces, while taking 
the oath of office. Similarly, the State Affairs Committee and Public Account Committee 
(PAC) were created as a mechanism of parliamentary oversight.20 The NIPS paper sheds 
light on Nepal’s quest to institutionalize democratic civil-military relations and explores 
the domestic dimension of CMR in Nepal. However, its scope of analysis is limited to 
internal dynamics only.  
The civil-military crisis of 2009, which arose with sacking of the Chief of the 
Army Staff by the Maoist-led government, provides a good opportunity to assess the 
impact of foreign power in the dynamics of CMR in Nepal. Then Prime Minister Puspa 
Kamal Dahal resigned over the fiasco of the sacking of the COAS General Katawal in 
2009.21 Many scholars portray the case as probably the nadir of civil-military relations in 
Nepal since the signing of CPA.22 The International Crisis Group reports that India has 
pursued increasingly interventionist policies through proxies in Nepali politics and it 
continues the policy of supporting the NA as the most reliable force against the Maoists 
or anarchy. Similarly, a prominent Nepal expert, Professor S. D. Muni, sees foreign 
support to the NA as instrumental in bringing down the Maoist-led government. He 
asserts that “India and the U.S. particularly looked towards the army sympathetically as, 
in their perception, a Nepal dominated by unrestrained and assertive Maoists could 
become a strategic liability in view of a rising China in the neighborhood.”23 This case 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 International Crisis Group, “Nepal’s Future: In Whose Hands?” Asia Report No. 173 (August 
2009), 6. 
22 Most diplomatic missions were concerned at Katawal’s possible dismissal more out of fears for 
stability and genuine doubts about Maoists’ ill intent than any great respect for him. But the real actor, as 
ever, was New Delhi. Mobilizing India’s big guns was not difficult, as India had been intimately involved 
in planning the downfall of the government. Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee played an 
important role, telephoning Jhalanath Khanal in China and advising him to return to Kathmandu and 
withdraw support to the Maoists. See International Crisis Group, “Nepal’s Future: In Whose Hands?” Asia 
Report No. 173 (August 2009). 
23 S. D. Muni, “State, Army and the Aam Admi in Nepal,” http://www.india-
seminar.com/2010/611/611_s_d_muni.htm. 
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study will be instrumental to analyze how foreign powers use their leverage to achieve 
their own vested interests in weak recipient countries.  
Peter Feaver’s work on coups claims the importance of external players. He 
asserts that although the civil-military relations theory traditionally focuses on coups, 
there are many other dependent variables in civil-military phenomena, such as military 
influence, civil-military friction, military compliance, and delegation and monitoring. 
They can be caused by external or internal factors. Feaver argues that “the presence of 
external threat or the pressure in the form of targeted aid and advice from influential great 
powers” can shape a country’s civil-military relations.24 
Being an underdeveloped country Nepal gets economic and security assistance 
from major external powers such as India, China, and the United States. This aid tends to 
influence the domestic as well as foreign policy of the country.25 Nihar Nayak asserts that 
the divergent interests of these influential powers sometimes complicate the very peace 
process and reconciliation which they intend to support. The article by Nayak sheds light 
on the involvement of competing external powers in Nepal, and this thesis will build on 
such competition to assess the impact on the policies of Nepal.   
Another scholar focusing on Nepal, Bruce Vaughn shows that foreign donors are 
in competition with each other and how their foreign assistance is tailored to achieve their 
own interests. According to him, India considers Nepal as a strategic link in its defense 
against China on a northern border. China, on the other hand, expects no anti-China 
activities by Tibetans or their supporters and considers Kathmandu as a significant place 
in China’s strategy of encircling India.26 The U.S. identifies Nepal as an important 
location to monitor the activities of troubled Tibet in China.27 This geo-political context 
clearly underscores Nepal’s strategic importance to security of the region. 	
                                                 
24 Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science, no.2 (1999): 
217‒222. 
25 Nayak, “Involvement of Major Powers,” 41. 
26 Bruce Vaughn, Nepal: Political Developments and Bilateral Relations with the United States, CRS 
Report RL34731(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Report Service, April 7, 2011), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/ crs/ row/RL34731.pdf. 
27Nayak, “Involvement of Major Powers,” 43. 
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The impact of foreign assistance on the recipient country, according to Bruneau 
and Trinkunas, depends upon the interest of the donor. For instance, the U.S. support for 
civil-military relations in Europe is more focused on effectiveness and efficiency, 
whereas civilian control is the priority in most cases in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.28  
The donor countries, therefore, continue to influence the politics of the recipient 
country. According to Muni, India plays an important role in every major political 
development in Nepal. For instance, India played a key role in creating an alliance 
between the seven political parties and the Maoists that subsequently paved the way for 
the comprehensive peace process.29 India is the largest military assistance provider. In 
2009 alone, it pledged to give $55 million to the Nepalese Army.30 In July 2013, India 
agreed to resume sending military supplies of various kinds, including lethal and non-
lethal weapons, which had been suspended since the royal takeover in 2005.31 
According to Campbell, China is mainly focused on “the one China policy,” and 
it seeks to ensure that Nepal does not allow any anti-China activities from its land.32 
Nayak, however, asserts that a shift in Chinese policy towards Nepal occurred since the 
Maoist party ascended into power after the election of the Constituent Assembly in 
2008.33 With the demise of the monarchy, Nayak maintains, China’s long-time stable 
partner in Nepal is seeking a suitable party to engage in a much closer and deeper 
                                                 
28 Bruneau and Trinkunas, “International Democracy Promotion,” 59‒61. 
29 Muni, “State, Army and the Aam Admi,” http://www.india-seminar.com/2010/611/611-
_s_d_muni.htm. 
30“Nepal’s Fitful Peace Process,” International Crisis Group Asia Briefing 120, April 7, 2011, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/nepal/B120-
Nepals%20Fitful%20Peace%20Process.  
31 Anil Giri, “After 8 Years, India to Resume Military Supplies to Nepal,” The New Indian Express, 
July 11, 2013, http://newindianexpress.com/nation/After-8-years-India-to-resume-military-supplies-to-
Nepal.   
32 One China policy refers to China’s own sovereignty and territorial claims, which are primarily 
concerned with denying official recognition to Taiwan and to claiming Tibet. Tibet is China’s so-called 
‘core interest,’ which essentially means that it is not open to negotiation and China will use all means 
necessary to protect it. See Ivan Campbell, “Nepal Case Study,” in China and Conflict-Affected States: 
Between Principle and Pragmatism, January 2012. 
33 Nihar Nayak, “Nepal: New ‘Strategic Partner’ of China?” Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analysis, March 30, 2009, http://idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/ 
NepalNewStrategicPartnerofChina_NNayak_300309.  
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relation. Akanshaya Shah claims that China had traditionally adopted a policy of non-
intervention in Nepal, but a controversial audio tape of 2009 revealed an alleged 
conversation of a financial deal to help the formation of a government under the Maoist 
leader. If true, it hints at the willingness of the north to get involved in the domestic 
politics of Kathmandu.34  
Military assistance to Nepal has been an important feature of Sino-Nepal 
relationship.35 Shah stresses that during the direct rule of the king in 2005, the U.S. and 
India refused to supply weapons. China was the only country that provided much sought 
after military assistance to Nepal. Since 2008, China has significantly increased military 
aid to Nepal.36  
In a broader sense, Jim Yardley opines, India and China share a common goal in 
Nepal. According to him, both desire political stability in Nepal so that their security 
concerns are addressed in a sustainable manner.37 Prashant Jha, however, states that in the 
years ahead it will be a challenge for Nepal to steer between China and India as these 
neighbors compete for more influence in the region.38 Ivan Campbell further declares that 
China’s increasing role can significantly change the balance of power and influence in 
Nepal. He claims China’s growing support means less dependency on India or upon U.S. 
assistance, which can weaken the leverage of India or the U.S. over democratization, as 
China often provides assistance without strings attached.39   
                                                 
34 The controversial audio tape of 2009 purportedly containing a conversation between Krishna 
Bahadur Mahara, the International Bureau Chief of the Unified CPN-Maoist, and an unknown Chinese in 
which Mahara was heard asking for 500 million rupees to buy 50 lawmakers to help form the government 
under Prachanda’s leadership, brought China into Nepal’s political debate. See Akanshya Shah, “Jiabao’s 
Cancelled Visit and Sino-Nepal Relations,” Observer Research Foundation, December 19, 2011, 
http://www.observerindia.com/ cms/sites/ orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?  
35 Akanshya Shah, “Jiabao’s Cancelled Visit and Sino-Nepal Relations,” Observer Research 
Foundation, December 19, 2011, http://www.observerindia.com/ cms/sites/ 
orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?  
36 Prashant Jha, “A Nepali Perspective on International Involvement in Nepal,” in Nepal in Transition: 
From People’s War to Fragile Peace, ed. Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 352‒355; Parashar, “China Doles out,” Hindustan Times, March 24, 2011.  
37 Jim Yardley, “China Intensifies Tug of War with India on Nepal,” New York Times, February 18, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/18/world/asia/18nepal.html?  
38 Jha, “A Nepali Perspective ,” 355. 
39 Campbell, “Nepal Case Study,” 20. 
 12
Assistant Secretary of State for the U.S., Dr. John Hillen, testified, “Security 
assistance is a critical foreign policy tool that allows … promoting key American values 
with respect to democracy, human rights, and civilian rule of the military.”40 He stressed 
that the U.S. provides training, advice, and assistance to the militaries of developing 
countries as a security assistance to further its foreign policy goals. Washington asserts 
that employment of such instruments helps to achieve the goals in a cost-effective way. It 
allows the U.S. to have political influence and encourages attitudinal changes in the host 
country.41  
While the literature available on civil-military relations in Nepal mainly illustrates 
domestic political dynamics, the role of foreign players is apparent. The current literature 
fails to analyze the various players involved in impacting the NA’s relations with the 
democratic civil authority. Although there is no dearth of literature on various security 
assistances to Nepal, virtually none of it analyzes how security assistance combined with 
their diverse interests, can influence the nature of the army of a developing country that is 
in transition to democracy. This thesis will contribute to the study of civil-military 
relations by combining the effect of foreign security assistance on the NA and its impact 
on the relations between army and the democratic civilian leaders.    
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This case study of Nepal will assess the impact of foreign security assistance 
provided by India, China, and the United States on civil-military relations.  
The research will be conducted from primary and secondary sources. The primary 
sources will encompass the newspapers, archives of government documents, agreements, 
press releases, seminar papers, and personal experiences of the author. Since the issues 
are current and developing, primary resources will have to be relied up on in considering 
the most recent events. However, theoretical and historical aspects of civil-military 
                                                 
40 Dr. John Hillen, Assistant Secretary of State, Political Military Affairs, “Security Assistance as a 
Tool for Building Capacity,” Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, 49. 
41 See “U.S. International Security Assistance Education and Training” in http:// 
www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/training.html.  
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relations will be dealt with through secondary resources, such as books, journal, articles, 
and theses.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter I includes the introduction, 
covering the major research question, the importance of the study, statement of the 
problem and hypothesis, literature review, methods and sources, and the overview of the 
thesis. Chapter II focuses on the various foreign assistances rendered to Nepal by India, 
China, and the U.S., and will attempt to answer why and in what forms this assistance is 
provided. This chapter will study the background of bilateral relations, vital interests, and 
different assistance programs of the donor countries in two specific period of time—from 
1990‒2005, when Nepal ushered in a multiparty democracy, and from 2006‒2012, when 
the country transitioned into a republic after successfully signing a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement with the rebellious Maoists. The Chapter III assesses the impact of external 
assistance on civil-military relations by analyzing the democratic civilian control and the 
operational effectiveness of the NA. Finally, Chapter IV contains the conclusion with 
some recommendations to donors to identify the best possible ways to contribute foreign 
assistance to build positive democratic civil-military relations.  
 14
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II. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO NEPAL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Nepal’s strategic importance increased substantially after it became an important 
buffer state between the two giants of Asia—India and China—especially after the 
Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950. Consequently, both neighbors came to compete for 
influence over Nepal through lending various forms of assistance. Nepal’s role as a 
transit between India and China for the flow of Tibetan refugees also highlights the 
country’s strategic position.42 Thus, as a small and underdeveloped country sandwiched 
between two competing regional powers, China and India, Nepal attempts to balance the 
conflicting interests of the two neighboring states and the world’s superpower.43  
Apart from its powerful neighbors, Nepal also gets substantial foreign assistance 
from extra-regional powers, such as the U.S., UK, Japan, South Korea, and European 
Union because of the growing importance of the region. The U.S. being the hegemonic 
power in the world, however, has more strategic and political interests in Nepal other 
than its immediate neighbors.44 These donors provide Nepal with foreign assistance in 
political, economic, and security arenas. Foreign aid in Nepal comprises almost a quarter 
of the national budget.45 As of 2010, Nepal has some 50 bilateral and multilateral 
development partners and over 100 International Non-Governmental Organizations 
(INGOs) active in Nepal. The foreign aid continues to be a major source of national 
budget for the government’s expenditure on development works.46 In addition, aid has 
also come in the form of military assistance. During the later years of the 
counterinsurgency campaign, foreign military assistance played an important role in 
                                                 
42 Campbell, “Nepal Case Study,” 4.  
43 Kamal Raj Sigdel, “Refugees and Geopolitics: Exploring the U.S. and Indian Influences in the 
Treatment of Bhutanese and Tibetan refugees in Nepal,” 2, http://www.icird.org/publications?task= 
file&action=download&path=% 5BDIR_PUBLICATIONS_ PAPER%5D02_kamalrajsigdel_fullpaper.pdf.  
44 Nayak, “Involvement of Major Powers,” 41.  
45 Vaughn, “Nepal: Political Developments,” 11. 
46 Joint Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration, Phase II, Nepal Country 
Evaluation, Ministry of Finance, http://www.oecd.org/countries/nepal/ 47671748.pdf. 
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enabling the Nepalese Army to launch effective military operations that successfully 
denied the Maoists a military victory.47 After the end of monarchy, both of Nepal’s 
neighbors increased military aid assuming the Nepal Army is the only strong and stable 
institution that can protect their strategic interests.48  
The scope of this chapter is limited to the study of foreign assistance from India, 
China, and U.S., who are largest providers of foreign aid and, particularly, aid that has 
influenced the country’s civil-military relations. Aid often comes as humanitarian 
assistance and development packages, but underlying the apparent, countries mostly use 
it to secure their economic, political, and security interests.49 This interplay of various 
assistances serving different and often competing interests can have consequences on the 
matters of security and foreign affairs of Nepal. In this context, this chapter will highlight 
Nepal’s bilateral relations with each of these countries, their vested interests, and various 
forms of assistance rendered to Nepal as it endeavors to exercise democracy. This chapter 
will also show that how foreign assistance is tailored to uphold the divergent interests of 
the donors and to check the influence of others.  
B. OVERVIEW OF INDO-NEPAL RELATIONS 
Nepal and India share 1800 kilometers of an open and unregulated border, which 
provides for shared strategic interests and socio-cultural similarities.50 Consequently, the 
two countries share special relations at a social and political level as well as at the 
strategic one. For instance, chief of army staff of the Indian Army is given the honorary 
rank of a general in the Nepal Army and a reciprocal honor is conferred on the chief of 
the Nepal Army.51 This relationship has a history which goes back to the British period, 
                                                 
47 Donald A. Camp, “United States Interests and Goals in Nepal,” The DISAM Journal (Spring 2005): 
50, http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/Vol%2027_3/Camp.pdf. 
48 Lok Nath Bhusal and Pritam Singh, “Externally Determined Development: Does Indo-China 
Rivalry Explain Nepal’s Underdevelopment?” Millennial Asia 2, no. 2 (2011): 170, 
doi:10.1177/097639961100200202. 
49 Nilanjana Biswas, “South Asian Aid Regimes,” HIMALSOUTHASIAN, December 17, 2013, 
http://www.himalmag.com/component/content/article/5212-southasian-aid-regimes.html.  
50 Nayak, “Involvement of Major Powers,” 42. 
51 “India-Nepal Relations,” http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ ForeignRelation/Nepal_Brief.pdf. 
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but at times, it has been tense. Yet, even when there were tensions, the military-to-
military relations between the two countries continued despite disagreements at the 
political level. India is Nepal’s largest aid provider and trading partner.52 
After the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814‒1816, the British East India Company was 
able to address its security interest by making Nepal a subordinate ally through 
subsequent treaties. The British viewed Nepal as a friendly buffer state in the north. As 
per the treaty of 1816 with the British, Nepalese Gurkhas served in the British Army 
alongside with the Indian armies. Since then, Nepal has enjoyed intimate military 
relations with the Indian Army.53 Therefore, in 1947, when India became independent, it 
inherited the same security concerns and relationship.54 This tradition of close military 
ties between the two countries still continues to exist. 
The Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed in 1950 is the bedrock of the Indo-
Nepal relations.55 The Chinese military intervention in Tibet in 1950 posed a common 
threat to the security of both India and Nepal, which resulted in a mutual security 
arrangement between two countries through the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950. 
According to the treaty, Nepal received many economic benefits, but it became 
dependent upon India for military training and purchase of the arms.56 The treaty also 
granted rights to the citizens of both countries to work, reside, and even obtain citizenship 
in each other’s country.57 Such provisions made the bilateral relations between India and 
Nepal unique and special. In addition, letters were also exchanged promising that “neither 
Government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. 
To deal with any such threat, the two governments shall consult with each other and 
                                                 
52 Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough (eds.), Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers: 
China and India (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), 301. 
53 See http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/history.php?#.  
54 See http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/history.php?#. 
55 “India-Nepal Relations,” http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ ForeignRelation/ Nepal_Brief.pdf. 
56 Sangita Thapaliyal, Mutual Security: The Case of India-Nepal (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers and 
Disrtibutors, 1998), 13. 
57 Aparna Pande, “India-Nepal: Sins of Omission and Commission,” May 21, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aparna-pande/indianepal-sins-of-omissi_b_1530994.html?  
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devise effective counter-measures.”58 Similarly, Article 5 of the 1950 Treaty provided 
that Nepal shall be free to import, from or through India, any war-like material or 
equipment deemed necessary for the security of Nepal with the prior agreement and 
assistance from the Government of India.59 This Article, however, has been a contentious 
one since 1989 when Nepal purchased weapons from China, as the two countries 
perceive it differently. India interprets the provision as an obligation for Nepal to consult 
and seek permission from India before buying any military hardware from the third 
country. Whereas, royalists and nationalists of Nepal argue that the Article 5 does not 
prohibit Nepal from buying arms from China as the arms do not come through the 
territory of India.60 
After the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Himalayas were no longer considered an 
impassable northern barrier by India, because the Chinese proved that with the 
advancement of technology in the fields of transport, communication, and military 
equipment the Himalayas are assailable.61 In this changed security context, India 
reassessed its policy towards Nepal. After the accession of King Mahendra to the throne 
in 1955, Nepal discarded the concept of special relationship with India and pursued the 
policy of equal friendship with both of its neighbors. Nepal established close ties with 
China after the King abrogated Parliament to establish an autocratic party-less political 
system called Panchyat.62 Although India declared such move as a setback to democracy 
in Nepal, in the wake of defeat in the Sino-Indian border war, India needed to engage 
                                                 
58 John W. Garver, “China-India Rivalry in Nepal: The Clash over Chinese Arms Sales,” Asian Survey 
31, no. 10 (1991): 956, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645066.  
59 Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy and David M. Malone, “A Yam between Two Boulders,” in Nepal in 
Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace, ed. Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 294. 
60 “Nepal: India Objects to Arms Purchases,” Economic and Political Weekly 23, no. 41 (1988), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4379147. 
61 Deeptima Shukla, “India-Nepal Relations: Problems and Prospects,” The Indian Journal of Political 
Science, 67, no. 2 (2006):361, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185622.     
62 ‘Panchayat’ was the political system of Nepal in effect from 1962 until 1990. It was based on the 
Panchayat system of self-governance historically prevalent in South Asia. It was formulated by King 
Mahendra after overthrowing the democratically elected government and dissolving the Parliament in 1960. 
The Panchayat system was first institutionalized by the 1962 Constitution of Nepal. The political system 
was a party-less “guided” democracy in which the people could elect their representatives, while real power 
remained in the hands of the monarch. 
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Nepal to keep it friendly. Therefore, realizing the deep-rooted relationship of the 
monarchy with the Nepalese society, India supported the King for stability over an issue 
of democracy.63 Subsequently, Nepal and India signed an Arms Assistance Agreement in 
1965.64 The agreement clearly stated that India would be the sole provider of the arms 
and equipment to the Nepal Army and only in the case of shortfall of supply from India, 
the U.S. and UK would provide additional assistance.65 Nepal probably agreed to these 
security arrangements for the regime security of the absolute monarchy that was in place 
since 1960 as India was willing to support the monarchy now.  
The strength of the Nepali and Indian relationship is also illustrated by the 
Tripartite Agreement of 1947 among the UK, India, and Nepal on the recruitment of 
Gurkhas (Nepalese) in the Indian Army and the disbursement of the pension to the retired 
servicemen.66 At present, there are nearly 30,000 Gurkhas serving in seven Gurkha 
regiments of the Indian Army.67 The Indian Military Pension Branch in Nepal today 
provides pensions to over 125,500 defense, para-military, and civil pensioners who have 
opted to draw their pensions in Nepal. The yearly amount of pension distributed is 
approximately Indian Rupees 12 billion.68 In addition to the pension amount, the serving 
soldiers also bring a similar amount of money to Nepal, so the relationship is strategic as 
well as economic as it is a significant source of income for Nepal.69   
                                                 
63 Shukla, “India-Nepal Relations,” 362. 
64 Chaturvedy and Malone, “Yam between Two Boulders,” 295. 
65 Padmaja Murthy, “India and Nepal: Security and Economic Dimensions,” Strategic Analysis 23, no 
9 (1999): 1536, doi:10.1080/09700169908455141. 
66 See www.parliament.uk/briefing.../SN04671.pdf. 
67 Utpal Parashar, “End of the Road for Gurkhas in Indian Army?” Hindustan Times, March 21, 2012, 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/comment/ columnsothers/ end-of-the-road-for-gorkhas-in-indian-army/ 
article1-828992.aspx#sthash.9cJ6OX92.dpuf.  
68Embassy of India, Kathmandu, Nepal, Pension Branch. http://www.indianembassy.org.np/ 
index1.php?option=e6r5wlVM8od_u8Y0CdwsDiTfg0cohLLpEcNS8hphu-0&id=yR69h-
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69 Utpal Parashar, “India’s Overseas Pension Army,” Hindustan Times, June 4, 2011, 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/india-s-overseas-pension-army/article1-
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1. Indian Interest in Nepal  
Although India’s stated interest in Nepal is to ensure “Nepal’s political stability 
and economic well-being through the development of its hydropower potential and a 
smooth flow of trade,” its approach is driven mainly by its security interests due to 
Nepal’s prime location.70 India’s foremost concern in guarding its interest in Nepal is 
Beijing’s evolving relationship with Kathmandu, and the fear of spreading Chinese 
influence in Nepal.71 China’s expanding footprints in Nepal, which will be discussed in 
the following section, have a strategic impact on the security of India. Nepal serves as a 
vital land barrier between India’s resource-rich Gangetic plains and autonomous region 
of Tibet.72 Therefore, the security threat to India emanates from the possibility that the 
Chinese forces can, upon entering Nepal, easily reach the Indian mainland as the Indo-
Nepal border is free from any natural barrier.73  
The Indian perspective on the security threat from the north was clearly stated in 
the speech to the Parliament by Prime Minister Nehru: 
Apart from our sympathetic interest in Nepal, we are also interested in the 
security of our own country. From time immemorial, the Himalayas have 
provided us with a magnificent frontier. Of course, they are no longer as 
impassable as they used to be, but they are still fairly effective. We cannot 
allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to 
India.74  
The issue of Pakistan’s alleged support of trans-border terrorism against India 
through the open borders of Nepal is another major security concern for India.75 India 
claims that Pakistan uses the open border to conduct various subversive activities against 
                                                 
70 S. D. Muni, “Bringing the Maoists,” in Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace, 
ed. Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 317. 
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72 Manish Dabhade and Harsh V. Pant, “Coping with Challenges to Sovereignty: Sino-Indian Rivalry 
and Nepal’s Foreign Policy,” Contemporary South Asia 13, no. 2 (2004):159, 
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73 Murthy, “India and Nepal: Security and Economic Dimensions.”  
74 Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946‒April 1961 (New 
Delhi: Publication Division, 1971), 436. 
75 Chaturvedy and Malone, “Yam between Two Boulders,” 302. 
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India. Although Pakistan denies such claims, the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC 
814 from Kathmandu to Delhi in 1990 by a Pakistani terrorist group, Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen, is an example proving such allegations to be true.76 
This security concern surrounding the open border policy was reflected in India’s 
perspective towards Nepali Maoists as well. India saw the probability of a spill-over 
effect of the Maoist success on its side of the border. The open border allows Maoists 
virtually unrestricted access to India and possible links with the Maoists groups in India. 
Thus, India wanted to see the Maoist party transformed into the mainstream political 
party at the earliest.77 However, when the Maoists formed a government as a majority 
party in the Constituent Assembly, both India and Nepali mainstream parties viewed the 
provision of ‘democratization’ and the ‘right-sizing’ of the NA in the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement of 2006 as a threat because Maoists might exploit it to take control of 
the state militarily and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. India and the traditional 
Nepali political parties saw NA as the ultimate force to check the Maoist takeover of the 
state, and thus they explicitly opposed the mass integration of Maoist combatants into the 
national army, which helped NA to uphold its organization and morale.78  
The Indian security perspective towards Nepal is based on the denial of a 
substantial role by any other external power.79 India considers Nepal as under its sphere 
of influence, and thus, it does not want to see an active role by any power without its 
agreement. Following the defeat of India in the 1962 border war with China, Nepal 
sought out the U.S. and UK for military assistance as the Indian military was already 
over-burdened with its own modernization process. Seeing the increasing involvement of 
extra-regional powers such as the U.S. and UK, India once again wanted to take a leading 
role in the modernization of the Nepalese Army. Hence, in January 1965, Nepal and India 
signed an Arms Assistance Agreement and India also took on the responsibility of training 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
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the Nepalese army officers. It can be said that once again India managed to become the 
dominant player in Nepal through military diplomacy.  
2. Indian Assistance to Nepal (1990‒2005) 
Against the backdrop of the Indian economic blockade when the pro-democratic 
movement was launched in 1990, the Indian political leaders and parties offered their 
political support to the democratic movement of Nepal. When the King used force to 
suppress the demonstrations, the Indian government condemned the crackdown on the 
popular democratic movement.80 Finally, on April 17, 1990, King Birendra dissolved the 
party-less Panchayat system and asked the opposition parties to form a government. The 
Prime-Minister-designate K. P. Bhattarai quickly sent a letter to the Indian Prime 
Minister requesting the normalization of relations between the two countries as it was in 
the period before 1989. As a gesture of appreciation to the political support rendered by 
India, the newly formed democratic government agreed to sign new transit and trade 
agreements. The government also cancelled the last consignment of equipment from 
China as a mark of addressing the Indian security concern.  
With the advent of democracy in 1990 in Nepal, India resumed assisting NA in its 
modernization. In 1993, India supplied the military hardware worth Indian Rupees 183 
million on grant basis and cash payment.81 India’s assistance in Nepal’s defense 
capabilities and the continuous training of Nepalese military leaders in the Indian military 
institute has kept them in close contact with each other. Since 2001, when NA was 
involved in the counterinsurgency operations against the Maoists, India also started to 
support Nepal’s effort to curb the insurgency actively. India was the first country to brand 
the Maoists as the ‘terrorists’ and it supported the military with supplies of both lethal 
and non-lethal weapons.82 
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Since 1947 India has maintained a policy called “twin pillars” towards Nepal’s 
politics; this policy considers the monarchy and the democratic political parties as the 
two pillars for stability in Nepal. However, when King Gyanendra grabbed absolute 
power in February 2005 from the government appointed by him just a few months before, 
the ‘twin pillar’ policy of India became unattainable as it directly brought the monarchy 
and political parties into conflict with each other. India reacted strongly against the royal 
move as it considered the King’s move a serious setback to democracy in Nepal.83 While 
India continued to make an effort to convince the King and democratic parties to 
reconcile, it suspended all military supplies to NA in order to pressure the King. To 
counter the Indian pressure, King Gyanendra looked for military support from the U.S. 
government, but in vain. Then he approached China and Pakistan for the same, and he 
was able to get military support from both countries in 2005.84 This was a problem for 
India as it would allow its adversaries’ access to Nepal.  
From the Indian perspective, the King was becoming increasingly unreliable to 
reestablish democracy in Nepal and the country was heading towards chaos with 
increasing political polarization due to the rise of the Maoists. Politically unstable Nepal 
would be detrimental to Indian security interests. Thus, in an effort to achieve stability in 
Nepal, India began to strengthen the solidarity among the different parliamentary parties 
to launch a struggle against the King by providing political as well as financial support.85 
On the other hand, after seeing the international environment opposed to their movement, 
the Maoists were seeking a safe-landing. Against the backdrop of Gyanendra’s rising 
political ambition and strong desire to curb insurgency militarily, India persuaded the 
Maoists to renounce violence and join the mainstream politics.86 Eventually, with 
facilitation from India, the seven democratic political parties and the Maoists formed an 
alliance to launch a popular movement against the King in April 2006. 
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3. Indian Assistance to Nepal (2006‒2012) 
Since the end of monarchy, India has continued to play an important role in the 
outcome of every major political development in Nepal. In 2006, India not only played a 
key role in creating an alliance among the seven political parties and the Maoists, but also 
persuaded the Nepali Army to convince the King that the military might not be able to 
control the popular movement.87 It is not clear how India convinced the military, but 
India is believed to have promised NA that it will render support to safeguard NA’s 
prerogatives and institutional interests in the changed political context in future. India 
played an important role as a facilitator to comprehensive peace treaty in Nepal by 
persuading the Maoists to agree to peace and foreign powers to solve Nepal’s problem 
peacefully. 
When the Maoists formed a government after the successful election of the 
Constituent Assembly in 2009, the Indian establishment found them more inclined 
towards China, which was viewed as detrimental to the interests of India. Therefore, 
when there was conflict between the Maoist government and the Chief of the Army Staff 
of the Nepal Army, India extended support to the army and implicitly applied its political 
weight to topple the Maoist-led government by asking non-Maoist parties to withdraw 
their support to the government.88  
India’s ability to influence the NA is due to its role in building Nepal’s defense 
capabilities and the continuous training of Nepalese military leaders in India. This has 
kept both militaries in perpetually close contact with each other. Up until recently the 
military-to-military relations were conducted from India only. The Nepal Army had not 
offered any training or conducted joint military exercises with India. However, since 
2010, the Nepal Army started to reciprocate by offering seats to foreign officers including 
those from India and China in the Nepalese Army Command and Staff College in 
Shivapuri. Likewise, since 2011 the Nepal Army started to train foreign officers, 
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including Indian officers, for counterinsurgency and jungle warfare training.89 The 
exchange of officers for such training further cements the bilateral military relation by 
forging professional military education on a personal as well as institutional level. 
C. OVERVIEW OF SINO-NEPAL RELATIONS  
Historically, Nepal’s relationship with China has been contentious. When Nepal 
invaded Tibet in 1854, China intervened in support of Tibet and forced Nepal to sign a 
treaty that demanded tribute for China. However, in 1908 Nepal stopped sending tribute 
to China and in 1911, broke any relations with China when Tibetans drove the Chinese 
out of Tibet. However, after the occupation of Tibet in 1950, Nepal became a 
geographical and cultural buffer between Tibet and Tibetan refugees living in India. 
Hence, the relationship was reestablished in 1955 and resident ambassadors were 
established in the respective countries.90 Nepal was one of the first non-Communist 
countries to receive Chinese aid in 1956 when China’s Premier Zhou Enlai visited 
Nepal.91 Ever since, bilateral relations have been positive.92   
Meanwhile, fearing an overwhelming Indian interference in internal matters, 
Nepal began to exercise diplomatic relations with China in 1960. Taking its cue from 
Nehru, Nepal embraced the strategies of neutrality and non-alignment.93 Consequently, 
China and Nepal signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1960.94 Also in the same 
year, both the countries signed a border agreement resolving the issues peacefully.95 The 
most important issue settled peacefully was demarcation of Mt. Everest on the boundary 
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line, with the northern half belonging to China and the southern half belonging to 
Nepal.96 On the occasion of celebrating the first anniversary of the Nepal-China border 
agreement, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister of China, Marshal Yi said that “in case 
any foreign army makes a foolhardy attempt to attack Nepal . . . China will side with the 
Nepalese people.”97 Nepal’s foreign policy of maintaining equal distance between its 
neighbors since 1960 provided enough counterweight to the heavy Indian influence over 
Nepal.   
China looks for maintaining relations with a credible nationalistic force in Nepal 
for political stability. Hence, in the past China supported the monarchy because it found 
the monarchy a credible and dependable partner over the democratic forces which were 
viewed as pro-Indian. Democratic forces were also viewed as unreliable because they 
might not take any action against Tibetans in Nepal, if they come to power.98 The King 
and royalist leaders adopted a close relationship with China to counter the Indian 
influence. However, in the absence of the monarchy after 2006, China sought to develop 
links with the Maoists to serve its interests in Nepal. The Maoists in Nepal also looked at 
China with sympathy due to ideological affinities and to gain political weight against the 
India-supported mainstream parties. Nevertheless, China seeks to maintain good relations 
with whoever comes into power to fulfill its objective in Nepal. In recent years, China 
has substantially increased its political, economic, and military aid to Nepal. 
1. Chinese Interest in Nepal 
The Himalayan nation holds an important place in China’s South Asia Policy as it 
is an entry point to the region. Likewise, Nepal draws the strategic interest of China as it 
is also a gateway into the volatile autonomous region of Tibet.99 Thus, stability in Nepal 
is a priority for China. China fears that an unstable Nepal will be used as a base for ‘Free 
Tibet’ activity by Tibetan refugees living in Nepal and transiting to India. Tibetans enjoy 
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support from the West and India. China also fears an unfriendly Nepal would give 
Tibetans access to safety zones. This is what drives its friendly overtures towards Nepal. 
Therefore, securing Nepal’s proactive support to curb any anti-China activities from 
Tibetan refugees and their sympathizers became a priority for China. 
Keeping in view the growing influence of India in the South Asia, China needed 
to keep a favorable balance of power in the region. Thus, reducing Nepal’s dependency 
upon India is a part of the strategic objective of China in South Asia.100 China’s Nepal 
policy options in this regard were severely restricted by the special security relations 
between Nepal and India emanating from the Treaty of Peace and Friendship1950. 
Understanding the relative advantage of India’s relations with Nepal due to their socio-
cultural proximity, China made strategic inroads into Nepal by rendering various forms 
of assistance. The Chinese assistance was mainly focused on ensuring the Nepal 
government’s continuation of the ‘One China Policy,’ enabling security forces to control 
the anti-China activities and keeping Nepal away from being too dependent in India. 
While assisting Kathmandu, Beijing is consciously making strategic inroads into Nepal 
without inciting the sensitivity of India. 
Currently, China’s concerns regarding Tibet continue when it comes to containing 
the influence of the U.S. in Nepal.101 They fear that the West led by the U.S. would 
exploit the Tibetan refugees in Nepal for anti-China activities.102 Evidently, in 1959, the 
CIA provided covert support to the Tibetan uprising, which left tens of thousands of 
Tibetans dead. Following the event, the Dalai Lama lived in exile in India and thousands 
of followers fled to Nepal and India. In the aftermath of the Indo-China War of 1962, the 
CIA worked closely with the Indian intelligence services to conduct covert operations in 
Tibet and by the mid-1960s the U.S.-trained ‘Khampa’ guerillas were operating from a 
base in a remote part of Nepal.103 China fears that increased involvement of the U.S. in 
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Nepal in the name of promoting democracy and human rights will undermine China’s 
core interest of keeping the integrity of Tibet. 
2. Chinese Assistance to Nepal (1990‒2005) 
During the economic embargo by India in 1989 and the political upheaval in 
1990, China was not able to provide much assistance to Nepal as it was going through a 
troublesome time due to the Tiananmen massacres. However, in the succeeding years as 
China’s situation returned to normal, Nepal continued to receive aid from China in 
exchange for Nepal’s steadfast commitment to the policies of maintaining equidistant 
relations between both neighbors, continuing commitment to ‘One China,’ and cracking 
down on anti-China activities from the Tibetan refugees.104 In 1996, during the visit of 
Nepalese Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, in a bid to build a good neighborly 
partnership and to emphasize people-to-people contact at the grass-roots level, a Sino-
Nepal non-government forum was established.  
China, however, lacks the ability to support Nepal overland as compared to India 
due to lack of road and railway connections between the two countries. When Nepal 
bought some arms, including air defense guns and medium range surface-to-surface 
missiles worth of $20 million from Beijing in 1988, India protested the deal citing it as a 
breach of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and virtually closed all but two out of 
17 transit routes to Nepal from India.105 The blockade had a devastating effect on the 
economy of Nepal.106 Yet China did not provide much assistance to Nepal despite the 
fact that the whole crisis was due to the Sino-Nepalese arms deal. China at that moment 
was under severe criticism from the West due to the Tiananmen Square incident, and 
under such conditions it did not want to alienate neighboring India by overwhelmingly 
supporting Nepal.107 This case illustrates the limitations of China’s support for Nepal 
against India’s security interest and economic link. 
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With the high intensity of Nepal’s fight against Maoist guerrillas, the U.S. 
involvement also grew in Nepal. The growing involvement of the U.S. alarmed the 
Chinese security interests. Therefore, China started to engage Nepal in more meaningful 
ways. In 2002, the Chinese Premier, Zhu Rongji, visited Nepal and pledged $10 million 
for various infrastructure development projects.108 
In 2005, China was the only country that supplied arms and ammunition to Nepal 
during King Gyanendra’s direct rule when the U.S. and India halted their military 
assistance in protest of the royal rule.109 Immediately after the royal takeover, China 
pledged $1 million in military assistance, offered some Armored Personnel Carriers and 
signed an agreement to provide three aircraft for logistical purposes to NA. Seizing the 
NA’s urgent need of armament, China has been able to develop military relations with 
Nepal, which had been a base of India’s special relationship with Nepal for a long 
time.110  
In addition to the military assistance, after an official visit of the Nepalese Foreign 
Minister to Beijing in August 2005, China offered additional assistance of $12.43 million 
to spend in any way Nepal wanted.111 Although the amount of assistance was not 
significant, the Chinese message to India and the U.S. was clear: it was going to take any 
opportunity to make inroads into Nepal regardless of the international situation and the 
system of governance in Nepal. Such fresh military aid from China significantly boosted 
the morale of the King and the military in the absence of support from major donors like 
India and the U.S. 
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3. Chinese Assistance to Nepal (2006-2012) 
Chinese assistance significantly increased in Nepal after the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006. The courtship between Nepal and China has 
gained momentum in the recent years as China has increased its aid money, investment in 
infrastructure development projects, and military assistance.  
Chinese aid to Nepal in 2005–06 was a mere $128, 200, but in the fiscal year 
2010–11, it reached $32.5 million.112 Although the aid money is not much compared to 
what Nepal gets from other major donor countries, the surge in the amount of Chinese aid 
is significant. China also reportedly pledged huge grants and loans worth $127.4 million 
to Nepal in 2011.113 
In 2008, China and Nepal announced an ambitious program of extending a 
railway link from Lhasa to the border of Nepal. If this project is completed, it is going to 
make an impact on India’s trade relations and security concern vis-à-vis Nepal.114 The 
railway link is expected to provide Nepal an alternative route for trade, energy supply, 
and access to the international market. For some time, China has strategically sought to 
minimize Nepal’s absolute dependency on trade and transit by opening up new avenues 
overland. Similarly, the railway link will enable Chinese troops to deploy rapidly from 
the Tibetan Autonomous Region into the heart of India through Nepal, if Nepal becomes 
China friendly. Chinese aid to infrastructure developments is often looked at from the 
security perspective, particularly by the Indian side. 
In recent years Chinese military assistance has also grown manifold, ranging from 
the supply of non-lethal weapons to the exchange of high-level delegations. On March 
23, 2011, the Chief of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Chen Bingde made a 
goodwill visit to Nepal. On the occasion, an agreement of the Chinese military aid worth 
$20 million to the Nepalese Army was signed. In addition to this assistance, the Nepalese 
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Army had already received a separate package earlier in 2008 and 2009.115 This deal of 
2011 was signed between the chiefs of the respective armies rather than between the 
governments. Some analysts indicated the incident as China’s willingness to engage 
directly with the military as it perceives the army as a more stable institution than the 
government.116   
The then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in a short visit to Nepal pledged to provide 
financial aid worth $140 million for infrastructure development, support to Nepal’s peace 
process, and to upgrade the Nepal police force.117 Chinese authorities are known to have 
been coordinating with Nepalese border authorities and security officials to enhance 
border security and upgrade police stations along the northern border of Nepal.118 China 
provided $ 2.5 million to strengthen the capacity of Nepal police in 2011.119 China’s 
engagement with Nepal is multi-dimensional and is guided by strategic interest. Chinese 
influence through various forms of assistance in Nepal is creeping to undermine the 
overwhelming influence of India and the West in the long-run. 
D. OVERVIEW OF U.S.-NEPAL RELATIONS 
Nepal and the U.S. established official relations in 1947. The first U.S. bilateral 
aid to Nepal came in 1951, signing a Technical Cooperative Agreement and Nepal has 
since received more than $2 billion in aid.120 There was no permanent legation 
established in Nepal until the uprising in Tibet in 1959.121 
China’s occupation of Tibet in October 1950 prompted the United States to 
support covert action in Tibet. The CIA sponsored a covert campaign against the 
                                                 
115 Ibid., 7.  
116 Ibid. 
117 Lama, “China and Its Peripheries,” 5.  
118 Bharti Jain, “China ‘Crushing’ Tibetan Dissident Groups in Nepal,” Times of India, May 12, 2013. 
119 Campbell, “Nepal Case Study,” 5. 
120 Remarks of Ambassador Scott DeLisi, U.S. Partnership for a Transforming Nepal Tribhuvan 
University, Embassy of the United States Kathmandu, Nepal, November 18, 2010. 
http://nepal.usembassy.gov/pr-11-18-2010.html. 
121 The 1959 Tibetan Uprising, or 1959 Tibetan Rebellion, began on March 10, 1959, when a revolt 
erupted in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. 
 32
Communist Chinese in 1956, which led to a bloody uprising in 1959, making the Dalai 
Lama flee to India and many of his followers to Nepal and India.122 The U.S.-trained 
‘Khampa’ rebels operated against the Chinese Communist Security Forces from the early 
1960s to 1973 using established forward operating bases in the remote districts of 
Mustang and Taplejung in Nepal.123 
Until 1965, the U.S. was the largest donor to Nepal, but its aid declined later for 
three primary reasons. First, as the U.S. began to have rapprochement with China in the 
early 1970s, the U.S. no longer considered Communist China to be a threat to the security 
of Nepal. Second, the U.S. was heavily committed in Vietnam during the same period. 
Third, after the 1960s many Western countries started to give aid to Nepal and since the 
U.S. did not have any significant economic interest in Nepal, it reduced the aid 
considering the aid from Western countries as supplementary to its own.124  
After the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign assistance programs to Nepal 
increased, as Nepal ushered in a multiparty democracy in 1990 and the U.S. geared up its 
strategy to encircle China. The U.S. assistance program has supported Nepal’s 
democratization process and promoted sustainable development through programs such 
as agriculture, health, family planning, environmental protection, and vocational 
education programs in Nepal. The annual bilateral U.S. assistance through the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State has 
averaged $54 million.  
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1. U.S. Interest in Nepal 
The declared objective of the U.S. policy towards Nepal is to help Nepal build a 
peaceful, prosperous, and democratic society.125 The U.S. interest in Nepal is guided by 
its fluctuating geo-strategic interests in the Asian region, where China and India are the 
two key countries of engagement.  
During the Cold War, U.S. policy towards Nepal was guided by three 
objectives— containment of Communism in South Asia, their interest in the Tibet issue, 
and Nepal’s use as a watch post for two emerging economic and military powers like 
China and India. The Communist victory over the nationalist force in China and its 
subsequent occupation of Tibet emphasized Nepal’s strategic importance for the United 
States, which had adopted a policy of containing communism all over the world.126 The 
U.S. identified Nepal as a strategic location to prevent the spread of communism to South 
Asia. Nepal’s geographic proximity with China and the absolute poverty of its people 
always made it susceptible to communist ideology. In the early Cold War period, the U.S. 
followed the policy of reducing poverty and preventing a Communist uprising 
indigenously or from outside. Thus, U.S. aid programs were focused on enhancing the 
livelihood of the Nepalese people and supporting the monarchy as a stable political 
institution.127  
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the U.S. started to consider India as a ‘strategic 
partner’ to counter the rising Chinese influence in the region, which it considers as a 
‘strategic competitor’.128 Since India and the U.S. have a convergent interest vis-à-vis 
China, the U.S.-India nexus has led to increased cooperation and collaboration on a 
number of issues, from promoting democracy in Nepal and supporting the 
counterinsurgency campaign to handling of the Tibetan refugees.129 
                                                 
125 See background notes on Nepal, U.S. Department of State, March 5, 2012. 
http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/nepal/198058.html. 
126 Nayak, “Involvement of Major Powers,” 45. 
127 Narayan Khadka, “U.S. Aid to Nepal in the Cold War Period: Lessons for the Future,” Pacific 
Affairs 73, no. 1 (2000):87, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2672285.  
128 Sigdel, “Refugees and Geopolitics,” 4. 
129 Ibid. 
 34
When the Maoists began their armed struggle in 1996, the United States declared 
its desire to help Nepal in addressing the root causes of the political crises and help the 
Nepalese overcome political and developmental problems. The U.S. foreign policy 
interests in Nepal seek to prevent Nepal from becoming a failing state and to prevent it 
from becoming another base for terrorists. The recent U.S. assistance to Nepal has sought 
to cement the gains in peace and security, help Nepal transition to democracy, and 
strengthen the democratic institution.130  
2. U.S. Assistance to Nepal (1990‒2005) 
After the escalation of the Maoist insurgency the U.S. security assistance to Nepal 
increased significantly. As such in June 2001, a U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation was 
established in the Kathmandu embassy to coordinate this increased volume of military 
assistance.131 When Sher Bahadur Deuba, known to be pro-U.S., became the new prime 
minister after the resignation of G. P. Koirala in July 2001over an issue of army 
mobilization against the Maoists, Christina Rocca, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
South Asia, visited Nepal to assess the security situation. Likewise, in January 2002, then 
U.S. Secretary of State General Colin Powell met with COAS along with others in Nepal. 
Shortly after his visit, the U.S. government pledged military assistance worth U.S. $ 20 
million to Nepal.132 
In January 2003, a U.S. military team from the United States Pacific Command 
(USPACOM) arrived in Nepal to train Nepal Army personnel and the shipment of some 
8000 M-16 rifles also arrived around the same time. In May, while a truce was still being 
negotiated, the U.S. embassy formally announced the inclusion of Maoists on the U.S. list 
of recognized terrorist groups.133 Also while the talks were going on, Nepal and the U.S. 
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signed an Antiterrorism Assistance Deal, which Maoists hailed as a U.S. design to foil 
the ongoing truce.134 
Although the U.S. has significantly increased its military involvement in Nepal, it 
accepts India’s centrality in providing military aid to Nepal due to its proximity, legacy 
of assistance, and strong strategic interest in the region. Thus, while providing military 
assistance to Nepal, the U.S. appreciated the leading role of India and ensured no 
competing long-term interest vis-à-vis India in Nepal.135 The U.S. withheld the supply of 
3,500 M-16 rifles to show its disapproval of the King’s authoritarian rule and the poor 
human rights record of the NA.136  
Providing military training under International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) is an important part of U.S. foreign military assistance programs. The IMET 
program has clear objectives of “fostering democratic civilian control, promoting human 
rights, and assisting [to] resolve civil-military.”137 The U.S. Army’s link with the Nepali 
Army was substantial to pursue the army brass to accept the supremacy of the civilians. 
Since most of the senior leadership of NA has been trained in the U.S., the two 
institutions have developed a close relationship.138 Currently, over 93 percent of the 
General Officers of the Nepal Army are graduates of one of the IMET-sponsored courses 
in the United States.139 
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3. U.S. Assistance to Nepal (2006‒2012) 
With a view to democratizing the army, the U.S. has made military assistance to 
the Nepal Army conditional on their cooperation in the investigation of the human rights 
violations issues.140 In an effort to respect the human rights issue NA established a 
dedicated Human Rights Cell under the Adjutant General branch in July 2002. This cell 
ensures that all military operations are conducted in accordance with International 
Human Rights Law (IHRL), International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and judicial 
proceedings. Besides, NA has made the teaching of IHRL and IHL mandatory in all 
Army career courses.141 The U.S. policy of a vetting procedure for human rights 
violations of a potential IMET candidate has significantly helped instill the value of 
human rights in the Nepalese Army.142 
“In 1990, U.S. Congress expanded the objectives of the IMET program to focus 
on fostering greater understanding of and respect for civilian control of the military, 
contributing to responsible defense resource management, and improving military justice 
systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.”143 
These programs with expanded objectives are called Expanded-IMET (E-IMET), and the 
Congress also authorized civilians to participate in such programs. Nepal is also a 
recipient of the E-IMET programs. It is hoped that through such programs more civilian 
leaders will gain a knowledge of civil-military relations. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Nepal is situated at a strategically important place. Due to its geo-political 
location Nepal draws attention from various external powers. Given Nepal’s size and 
location, its powerful neighbors have a dominant say in its security and foreign affairs. 
As long as these forces continue to compete in extending their power and influence in the 
region, Nepal will continue to face the harsh implications of the competition. 
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Being a poor and underdeveloped country, Nepal receives a significant portion of 
foreign assistance. However, the donor countries are often motivated by their own vested 
interests; consequently one sees the different results from similar kinds of aid. Nepal’s 
three important donors, India, China, and the U.S. not only have different interests in 
providing assistance to Nepal, but these interests are often at odds and can come in 
various forms, such as military, economic, or political.  
Keeping Nepal friendly to India in the area of security and minimizing the 
Chinese influence has been a primary objective of India’s Nepal policy. On the other 
hand, minimizing Nepal’s dependence upon India and keeping Nepal neutral has been an 
important Chinese objective. China wants to minimize the influence of India in Nepal so 
that it can expand its footprint, whereas India intends to keep Nepal under its sphere of 
influence without any significant presence of foreign powers.144 An expanding Chinese 
presence in Nepal will be alarming for India as Nepal’s border is open and mostly free of 
any natural barriers. The U.S.-India nexus in support of the Nepali government is mostly 
guided to countering Chinese influence in Nepal. The U.S. has sought to limit Chinese 
influence in Nepal not only in the military sphere but also in the economic and political 
spheres.145 
In comparison to Indian and U.S. assistance, China does not attach the string of 
democracy and governance of the recipient country to its assistance. China often portrays 
the focus of its aid policy as non-interference in internal affairs and respect for the 
sovereignty of the recipient county. China’s foreign assistance in Nepal is mostly targeted 
to pro-establishment interests and largely remains independent of the regime type in the 
recipient country.  
Prior to Nepal becoming a republic in 2006, the NA was looked at through the 
window of monarchy. However, as the NA came out from behind the curtains after the 
end of the monarchy, foreign powers started to entertain it separately. NA began to take a 
distinct place in the changing political context of Nepal. When all of Nepal’s powerful 
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donor countries asserted the NA as the bastion of stability and provided military 
assistance to fulfill their own divergent interests, Nepal’s civil-military relations were 
impacted by such direct foreign assistance to the military. Some of the examples of 
external powers dealing directly with the army can be seen when India overtly supported 
the NA in a debacle over the sacking of COAS by the rightfully-elected government of 
the Maoists. In a separate event, the Chinese PLA signed an agreement worth $20 million 
of military assistance directly with the NA. Events like these show that military has 
gained the attention of foreign power. Under the given political instability, when political 
leaders are increasingly failing to fulfill the people’s demand, direct link of the military 
with foreign powers can destabilize the already fragile civil-military relations.  
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III. DYNAMICS OF DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS IN NEPAL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Nascent democracies usually find themselves in a dilemma while dealing with the 
matters of CMR in accordance with the democratic norms, values, and practices. The 
controversies are even more severe in post-conflict societies transitioning toward 
peaceful democratic politics. Nepal’s political setting consists of both complexities as 
Nepal attempts to democratize in a post-conflict setting. Interestingly, despite CMR 
provisions in the various constitutional frameworks, Nepal’s democratic CMR have 
remained comparatively unstable in its quest for democracy since 1990.  
This research studies the impact of foreign assistance from the three powerful 
states, India, China, and the U.S. on the CMR of Nepal. It particularly compares the 
impact of their assistance on the relations between the civilian government and the 
military since 1990 when Nepal began to consolidate itself as a multiparty democracy. 
The study finds that different foreign assistance guided mainly by the donors’ geo-
strategic and political interests rather than the interests of the recipient country has 
influenced the dynamics of CMR in Nepal. Thus, the causes of unstable CMR in Nepal 
should not be viewed as due to domestic concerns only.  
The dynamics of CMR and the impact of foreign assistance discussed in this 
chapter are divided into two periods: the first is from 1990 to 2005, and the second from 
2006 to 2012, two important and distinct phases of democratization in Nepal. While the 
first period experienced a significant move toward multiparty democracy and the 
beginning of Maoist insurgency, the second period witnessed the Maoists’ entrance into 
mainstream politics, an emergence of a republic after a successful election of the 
Constituent Assembly (CA), and dissolution of the CA in 2012 as it failed to promulgate 
a new constitution in the stipulated time. It is imperative to analyze the dynamics of CMR 
during these two periods of Nepal’s quest for democratization to assess the impact of 
foreign assistance on the CMR in Nepal.   
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B. BACKGROUND OF THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN NEPAL 
In February 1959, Nepal held its first parliamentary election that provided 
ordinary Nepali people an opportunity to practice an electoral democracy for the first 
time. However, the experiment with democracy ended rather shortly when King 
Mahendra dissolved the Parliament abruptly and declared a state of emergency at his 
discretion in December 1960.146 In 1962, he proclaimed a new constitution under which 
he and his successor King Birendra directly ruled the country for the next three decades 
through a party-less autocratic Panchayat system.147 The Shah dynasty ruled through an 
unwavering support of the military and retained full authority over the military as kings 
have done historically in Nepal. The 1962 Constitution also made a provision that barred 
any bill or amendment related to the military to be introduced in the Parliament without 
the consent of the king. Knowing the importance of controlling the army, the King 
established the Military Secretariat in the royal palace, which handled military affairs.148 
Through such a framework, the King retained the sole control over the national Army; 
hence, there was no question of democratic control of the military in Nepal until 1990, 
when the setting changed again.  
In 1990, the People’s Movement ended the autocratic party-less Panchayat regime 
and ushered Nepal into a new era of parliamentary democracy with a constitutional 
monarchy. Along with the restoration of democracy, control over the army became a 
contested realm between the king and the political parties. Since the king coveted the 
traditional prerogatives in the new constitution and the political parties wanted to bring 
the military under the democratic government, tensions over the control of the military 
dominated the drafting of the new constitution. In order to resolve the problem, the 
Constitution of 1990 maintained the King’s authority as the Supreme Commander of the 
Army but mobilizing authority was made possible only on the recommendation of the 
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National Security Council, which was comprised of the Prime Minister, the Defense 
Minister, and the Chief of the Army Staffs. However, the Act on The Rights, Duty, 
Function and Terms of the Service of the Commander-in-Chief (1969) remained 
unchanged, which deemed the Chief of the Army to be responsible to His Majesty rather 
than the elected government. Thus, largely due to the provision of this Act, the military-
monarch relations remained the same. At the same time, the CMR deteriorated severely 
in the period leading up to the royal takeover in 2005 as the civil authorities tried to wrest 
control from the military.149 
In 2005, following the royal takeover, the seven political parties of the dissolved 
parliament formed an alliance called the Seven Party Alliance (SPA). This alliance, 
together with the Maoists, who had been launching an armed rebellion since 1996, 
launched a people’s movement in April 2006, which forced the king to reinstate the 
parliament in May 2006.150 This successful popular movement led to the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement that laid the foundations for future development of the 
CMR in Nepal. Recognizing the urgency of bringing NA under democratic civilian 
control, the reinstated parliament scrapped the king’s title as the Supreme Commander-
in-Chief and renamed the Royal Nepal Army as the Nepal Army on May 18, 2006.151 
Subsequently an interim constitution of 2007 was promulgated and Nepal was declared a 
democratic republic by the first session of the CA in 2008.  
Learning from the mistakes of the previous constitutions, the new interim 
constitution sought to make a significant contribution to provision for democratic control 
of the army, which is described later in this chapter. With some exceptions of civil-
military friction, the constitutional framework and NA’s increasing exposure to 
international training and academics has been fostering democratic CMR in Nepal since 
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2006.152 Therefore, to assess the impact of foreign security assistance on the CMR, it is 
imperative to understand CMR developments after Nepal began to democratize since 
1990.  
C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (1990‒2005)  
1. Transition to Multiparty Democracy: Army Reluctant To Accept 
Civilian Control 
In 1990, the People’s Movement ended the 30-year autocratic Panchayat regime 
under the direct rule of the monarchy and established a multiparty parliamentary 
democracy with a constitutional monarchy. Fearful of a sudden regressive move from the 
royalist forces if the king was not given any space, the parties agreed to a constitutional 
monarchy. Thus, on November 9, 1990, a new constitution was promulgated as a 
compromise document.153  
From the beginning of drafting of the constitution, the army lobbied to maintain 
the sovereignty of the king because traditionally NA was absolutely loyal to the 
monarchy. Army generals were known to pressure the interim Prime Minister K. P. 
Bhattarai to ensure sovereignty of the King and autonomy of the military.154 The Royal 
Nepal Army also submitted a written recommendation to the Constitution 
Recommendation Commission for the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Nepal to be vested 
in His Majesty, rather than in the Nepalese people. Besides this, as an attempt to show 
solidarity and apply pressure, some fifteen generals met the Interim Prime Minister K. P. 
Bhattarai to assert their preference for vesting the sovereignty of Nepal upon the King as 
it had been in the past.155 The military further suggested to not to place the army under 
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the control of the representatives of the people, claiming that doing so would politicize 
the institution.156  
Nepal Army’s explicit determination to be under the monarch and their relentless 
attempts to manipulate the constitution drafting commission to retain sovereignty in the 
King clearly suggests that in spite of the change in the politics, the Nepal Army was 
reluctant to change its loyalty. This was an early indication of civil-military friction in the 
coming years of Nepal’s polity.  
Although the transition from party-less autocratic regime to multiparty democracy 
presented an opportunity to bring the army under meaningful democratic control, the civil 
state failed to assert a civilian supremacy due to an ambiguity over the authority of 
control and mobilization of the armed forces.157 
2. The Legal and Constitutional Framework for CMR 
The 1990 Constitution for the first time tried to bring the NA under democratic 
control through Article 118 on Provisions Regarding the Royal Nepal Army, which 
ensured that the King only operated and used the Royal Nepal Army on the 
recommendation of the National Defense Council (NDC). The Council consisted of the 
Prime Minister as the chairman, and the Defense Minister, and the COAS as members. 
Likewise, Clause 119 identified His Majesty as the Supreme Commander of the Royal 
Nepal Army and that the COAS of the Army shall be appointed by His Majesty on the 
recommendation of the Prime Minister.158 These two articles give the Prime Minister de 
jure power to control the army because the King can mobilize the army or appoint the 
COAS only on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Nevertheless, the King always 
retained de facto control over the army.  
Although the NDC was formed to oversee matters related to the Royal Nepal 
Army, this council was virtually unable to function as the army was controlled, 
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mobilized, and managed under the Army Act of 1959 that made the army accountable to 
the King. Thus, the army was not responsible either to the government or to the 
Parliament.159 It was only after the Popular Movement II that the new Army Act of 2006 
replaced the Act of 1959.  
3. The Civil-Military Gap 
The 1990 Constitution failed to transfer the inherent sovereign power of the king 
and loosen the royal grip on the military to bring it under the purview of Parliament. 
Instead, the elected governments focused more on civil administration, foreign relations, 
and police matters, but ignored the military and security matters. Part of the reason why 
politicians never tried to bring military leaders into their advisory circle is the mutual 
mistrust between army top brass and the political parties.  
The relations between the generals and civilian leaders never harmonized in the 
post-1990 democratic period as the generals openly detested the parties and made no 
secret of their allegiance to the King.160 On the other hand, civilian leaders mostly looked 
at the military with suspicion mainly because of the military’s loyalty to the monarch and 
the lack of personal connections between the politician and the generals, as the latter 
usually came either from aristocratic families or knew someone with close connections to 
the royal family. 
As Nepali and Subba say, “the different formative experience and early 
socialization process of the elites of the civil and military institutions and their divergent 
interpretation of the country’s past have created some discrepancy in the core values and 
worldviews of the military and civilian establishments.”161 The relations between the 
army and political party are inherently conflict-ridden because the military with its 
corporate interests views the politicians as intruders into the established political order. 
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Thus, there is a persistent problem of reconciliation between democratic political forces 
and the military.162 
4. Legislative Control Measures 
The successive governments of the multiparty democratic era never considered 
reforming the NA for the good of the government or for the people, in general. Politicians 
both in the government and in the Parliament showed very little interest in probing the 
sensitive issues of military affairs. One of the main reasons for ignoring security issues 
was the complete lack of security knowledge and risk-averse attitude of the politicians.163 
For most of the politicians the military did not actually matter for their electoral 
constituencies. Thus, they seldom took any interest to probe into the military affairs.  
Likewise, parliamentary committees did not make any efforts in formulating any 
policies to bring the security sector under the scrutiny of the Parliament.164 Even though 
Article 118 (3) of the Constitution of 1990 maintained that the establishment and 
management of the Army be determined by law, the Parliament did not make any new 
law regarding the Army. Instead the management and mobilization of the Army 
continued as per the Army Act of 1959, which sharply contrasts with the Constitution of 
1990. On the other hand, the Tasks, Duties and Rights of Chief of the Army Staff and 
Service Limitation Act 1969 remained enacted, which maintained the Chief of the Army 
Staff be loyal to the King.165 As such, the constitutional vision of keeping the Army 
under an elected parliament and the government pursuant to the Constitution of 1990 did 
not materialize. 
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5. Maoist Insurgency and the Beginning of Civil-Military Friction: 
Effectiveness of the Neglected Military 
The Maoists launched a ‘People’s War’ on February 13, 1996, with a view to 
overthrow monarchy and write a new constitution through a Constituent Assembly.166 In 
September 1997, the army proposed a plan to launch a division-sized force along with a 
development package of approximately 6.5 million Rupees in the badly-hit insurgency 
area to curb the insurgency at the early stage.167 Despite full preparations, the 
government rejected the army plan citing the budget was too high and instead decided to 
deploy only the police force to fight the insurgency.168 Had the government deployed the 
army at an early stage when the rebels were badly organized and poorly armed, matters 
might not have taken the turn they did.169 Nepali and Subba write that the mistrust 
between the Nepali Congress Party, who formed the government at the time, and the 
Army was the main reason for not deploying the military. The party had doubts about the 
loyalty of the Army and it did not wish to see the power of the military grow.170 In other 
words, the friction in civil-military relations at the time allowed the insurgency to 
expand. 
Prior to mobilization against the Maoist insurgency in 2002, the government of 
the time had severely cut resources to the NA.171 After 1991, for the next five years, the 
NA was not provided with sufficient budget. As the regular spending, such as salaries, 
allowances, and rations, accounted for nearly 80 percent of the limited budget, the 
Army’s effectiveness was severely affected due to lack of resources to spend on 
enhancing professionalism. Therefore, as a result of the government’s exclusive focus on 
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control and its neglect of the Army’s needs caused a severe imbalance in the course of 
having democratic civil-military relations.  
6. Executive Control Mechanism 
The question of civilian control over the army became apparent only when the 
civilian government sought to mobilize the military in a counterinsurgency operation in 
2000.172 In an attempt to retain a civilian majority in the NDC and to lay the groundwork 
for the mobilization of the NA, Prime Minister Koirala for the first time appointed a 
separate Defense Minister.173 King Birendra was not in favor of using the military against 
his own people, thus when the government wanted to mobilize the military, its leadership 
shirked by citing pre-conditions for mobilization. The pre-conditions included demands 
such as the declaration of a state of emergency, consensus among all parties for army 
mobilization, and labeling of Maoists as terrorists.174 However, when the Prime Minister 
recommended mobilizing the NA, even without meeting all the pre-conditions, the King 
did not approve it.175 When King Gyanendra revoked the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister, the dispute over the mobilization led to a severe civil-military friction, which 
resulted in the resignation of the Prime Minister in July 2001. In spite of the 
constitutional framework of the civilian control, the King used his de facto traditional 
power to prevail over the democratically elected civilian government. As the insurgency 
intensified, the civilian control over the army severely deteriorated. After the resignation 
of the Prime Minister, the nexus between the King and the military became even stronger. 
As the security situation of the country further deteriorated, the state of emergency was 
declared in November 2001, and the military started to take the center stage while the 
executive control began to decline due to mobilization of the military for the 
counterinsurgency operations.  
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7. Royal Takeover 2005: Worsening CMR 
King Gyanendra’s desire to take advantage of the political chaos during the height 
of the Maoist insurgency greatly worsened the CMR in Nepal. The failure of political 
parties to govern effectively encouraged the King to assert an active role in Nepalese 
polity.176 In February 2005, the King assumed state power, dismissing the elected 
government, and placing the political leaders behind bars. The military reassumed its 
position in the center of politics by defending the royal regime.177 King Gyanendra 
directly ruled the country with the support of the military, which was used extensively to 
suppress the political parties, civil service, media, and civil society.178 As a result of such 
harsh employment of the military against the people, the CMR worsened even more.  
D. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ON CMR 
(1990‒2005) 
The impact of foreign assistance on CMR during the period from 1990 to 2005 is 
divided into two phases. The first period is from 1990 to 2001, covering the advent of 
democracy until mobilization of the NA against the Maoists. The second period is from 
2001 to 2005, the time of NA mobilization in the counterinsurgency campaign until the 
King directly took the power into his own hands. In the first phase foreign assistance did 
not play an important role in shaping the CMR as it was mainly focused on economic 
development, but during the second phase the increased foreign assistance from the three 
main donors, especially the military assistance, was vital in the outcome of the CMR in 
Nepal.  
During 1990 to 2001, foreign assistance from India, China, and the U.S. came 
mainly in the economic category. Although India and the U.S. provided political support 
to the pro-democratic movement and could have tied in their aid to reform, they left 
democratization and CMR as an internal matter of Nepal. In addition, none of the donors 
showed significant interest in assisting the military as it was a low priority in comparison 
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to economic development. Even though the Maoists insurgency had started in 1996, the 
donor countries paid little attention considering it as a law and order problem. The NA 
faced “attention deficits” from its own political leadership and external donor countries.  
Consequently, one may argue that until 2001 the CMR in Nepal was unstable 
largely due to domestic causes. Although there was some ambiguity in the constitutional 
framework for CMR, the 1990 Constitution allowed for enough provisions for democratic 
CMR. However, the civilian leaders could not implement the entire range due to the 
relationships between military and the royalty. In an effort to assert control over the 
military, the civilian leaders failed to enhance effectiveness in the military which made 
the military leadership dissatisfied with their political masters and unwilling to declare 
their allegiance to the civilian leaderships. This was mainly due to three issues. First, as a 
legacy of history, democratic political parties looked at the military as a threat to 
democracy because the military had always sided with the monarchs in suppressing the 
democratic movements in the past. Thus, civilian leadership wanted to gain control over 
the military at any cost. Second, the politicians either lacked the knowledge about the 
military or did not give priority to military affairs as compared to partisan politics. 
Finally, the lack of available resources forced the politicians to compromise on the 
effectiveness of the military. Thus, the foreign assistance had virtually no impact on the 
civil-military relations between 1990 and 2001.  
In the period from 2001 to 2005, the security assistance from India, China, and 
the U.S., with their divergent interests, fueled the political ambition of King Gyanendra 
and culminated in a severe civil-military crisis. When Maoists attacked NA barracks in 
November 2001, foreign powers like the U.S. and India started to provide substantial 
military assistance to NA. As part of the “War on Terror” the U.S. visualized the worst 
combination of Maoist guerillas providing safe haven for the international terrorist 
groups in Nepal. The U.S. increased its engagement with NA by establishing an Office of 
Defense Cooperation, followed by visits of high level delegations, the supply of arms, the 
imposition of U.S. training teams in Nepal, and a pledge of $20 million in military 
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assistance to NA.179 The U.S. declared the Maoists as terrorists and signed an 
Antiterrorism Assistance Deal with Nepal. 
In the wake of 9/11, India swiftly supported the U.S. “Global War on Terror,” 
with the hope that such a move would give India some leverage to put pressure on the 
Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism. In addition, India had its own Maoist problem 
as the group prevented implementation of special economic zones in the country’s eastern 
corridor. Thus, India branded the Maoists as terrorists even before the Nepal 
government’s declaration, as the group was still engaged in the peace talks with the 
Nepal government.180 India’s security analysts started to link Nepal’s Maoists with the 
Naxalites of India and their possible cooperation, which would impact Indian borders. 
Therefore, India intensified its support to counterinsurgency in Nepal. 
While the U.S. and India were providing military assistance to Nepal in pursuit of 
their own interests, King Gyanendra, in a series of moves and with the tacit support of the 
NA, consolidated his position amidst Nepal’s deteriorating security and ineffective 
political situation. The overwhelming support of both India and the U.S. militarized the 
situation to the extent that political leaders were sidelined. It was only after February 
2005 when the King assumed direct rule that India and the U.S. condemned the royal 
move as a setback to democracy and suspended all military support in protest. In spite of 
reading early signs of derailing democracy and motivated by fulfilling their own interests, 
the U.S. and India gave priority to stability over democracy, but by that time they realized 
enough damage had occurred to CMR in Nepal.  
Meanwhile, China was slow to react to the Maoists movement; although, it made 
clear early that China had nothing to do with the ongoing movement sticking to the 
policy of non-interference in others internal matters. Early on China made it clear that the 
Maoists were not getting support from them. As the involvement of the U.S. increased 
after 2002, China also began to engage in Nepal’s affairs, but not as actively as the U.S. 
and India because China still considered the Maoist problem as an internal matter of 
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Nepal, and China was hesitant to get involved in the internal affairs of its neighbor. In 
addition to Pakistan, China was the only other country that provided military and 
economic assistance to the royal regime in 2005 when all others suspended the military 
aid. China had long maintained good relations with the monarchy in Nepal and viewed it 
as an instrumental institution to protect its security interest in Nepal. Thus, China seized 
the opportunity to make inroads into Nepal through military aid. China had no serious 
concern about the civil-military relations as it despised the democratic parties being pro-
Indian and the whole democratic setup as an American design. 
E. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (2006‒2012): CONTINUED 
INSTABILITY 
1. The Transition to a Democratic Republic 
This section covers the evolution of CMR during the period from 2006 to 2012. In 
spite of the abolition of the monarchy, the CMR remained unstable during the period of 
study. This period saw the signing of the CPA, successful conduct of CA elections, 
declaration of the republic, reintegration of the qualified Maoist combatants into the NA, 
and the dissolution of the CA without promulgating a new constitution.  
Nepal’s political course changed significantly when the parliamentary parties 
along with the Maoists launched a popular democratic movement in April 2006 against 
the autocratic regime of the King. The 19-day popular uprising forced the King to revive 
the Parliament in May 2006. Soon after the reinstatement of Parliament, a coalition 
government was formed and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed between 
the government and the Maoists. The peace agreement marked an end to the ten-year-old 
Maoist insurgency and paved the way for the election of the CA. On May 28, 2008, the 
historic first meeting of the CA declared Nepal a federal democratic republic, abolishing 
the 240-year-old monarchy.181 Until then, “as an institution the army had enjoyed a 
relatively comfortable existence: the palace’s patronage reinforced the crown-centered 
nationalistic rationale for its existence while insulating it from the challenge of making 
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tough strategic decisions.”182 Now with the abolition of the monarchy, possibilities had 
opened up for the democratically elected government to bring the army under the scrutiny 
of the civilian leadership. On the other hand, there was an equal threat of the military 
becoming politically active if civilian leadership and other democratic institutions failed 
to handle it properly. 
2. Extra-Constitutional Control Mechanism: The Media’s Power 
While the reinstated Parliament scrapped all the power the King had over the NA, 
the civilian leadership was looking cautiously for any move by military top brass against 
the present polity or in support of the King. When a national daily published a 
controversial speech of NA’s Acting Western Divisional Commander, Brigadier General 
Dilip S. J. B. Rana, the government promptly initiated an enquiry regarding his 
controversial remarks. In his speech on February 5, 2007, Brigadier Rana claimed that 
political instability, rampant corruption, and poor governance after the restoration of 
democracy in 1990 were the causes of Maoist violence. He added that NA relentlessly 
fought the Maoists for the cause of the nation and forced the latter to renounce the 
politics of violence and sit for dialogue.183 The Interim Legislature-Parliament 
Committee summoned the COAS, General Rookmangud Katawal to record his statement 
regarding the controversial remarks made by the Division Commander.184 Later, 
Brigadier Rana was charged for making remarks contrary to the “tradition and policy” of 
the NA, and he was discharged from the service.185 This incident heralded the power of 
external control mechanisms such as the media and civil society in controlling the 
military’s actions indirectly. The government’s prompt action against a serving general 
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sent a strong signal to the army about the willingness of the political parties to assert 
control of the army. 
Despite widespread suspicion, the NA remained apolitical while the country 
transitioned into a republic, and it helped the election commission to conduct the election 
of the CA. For instance, the army remained in the barracks during the crucial phase of 
transition. Had the army made a move, the country could have easily plunged into violent 
conflict and the peace process would have easily derailed.186 Gautam writes, “It has been 
a mark of Nepal Army’s professionalism and sensitivity to the winds of political change 
that, although accused of being ‘royalist’, it did not attempt to intervene in Nepal’s 
dramatic political transition … that led to the abolition of monarchy and coming to 
power, through elections, of CPN-Maoists against which it had previously fought a bitter 
war.”187 Nepal Army’s willing allegiance to the principles of civilian supremacy, together 
with the tight scrutiny of extra constitutional powers like that of the media, civil society, 
and rights groups, had rightly set the stage for positive civil-military relations .  
3. Executive Control Measures: The Civilian Supremacy  
Learning from the past mistakes of the Constitution of 1990, the interim 
Constitution of 2007 made a significant effort to bring the military under the democratic 
civilian control. For instance, the interim constitution revoked the membership of the 
Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) from the National Security Council (NSC) and added four 
more cabinet ministers to the Council.188  
Unlike the 1990 Constitution, with the abolition of monarchy and removal of the 
C-in-C from membership on the Council, the NSC was comprised of civilian leaders 
only. Article 145 provides for the creation of the NSC. It was created to recommend on 
mobilization and operation of the Nepal Army to the Council of Ministers. The NSC is 
chaired by the Prime Minister and other members, including the Home Minister, Defense 
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Minister, and three other ministers designated by the Prime Minister. The Defense 
Secretary acts as a Member-Secretary and in his/her absence the person designated by the 
Prime Minister acts as Member Secretary.189 
The NSC, however, has remained largely defunct and has not produced any policy 
regarding the security of the state. Nepal is yet to write a national security strategy. 
Consequently, there is a lack of clarity on the roles and missions of the military. 
4. Legislative Control 
Clause 2 of Article 5 of the interim constitution has a provision that a decision of 
the government to mobilize the NA should be placed before the Special Security 
Committee of the Parliament for approval within three days. Such a provision allowed the 
people’s representative to control state security agencies and made executive accountable 
to it.190 Additionally, as an oversight agency, the State Affairs Committee has the 
following responsibility regarding the NA: 
 To get and discuss The Annual Report about the management of Nepal 
Army submitted to The Nepal Government by the Commander in Chief of 
Nepal Army. 
 To discuss and consider on the annual report of the Military Welfare Fund 
submitted through the fund’s Guardian to the committee under the Nepal 
Army Act 2006 regarding the income, expenditure, and progress report 
about the fund.191 
The President of the Republic of Nepal is designated as a Supreme C-in-C of the 
NA under the provision regarding the formation of the army pursuant to Article 144 of 
the amended constitution. Similarly, it also provided that the President shall appoint the 
COAS on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers.192 According to the interim 
Constitution of 2007, the President retains the final authority to operate and mobilize the 
NA on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers.  
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5. Judicial Control Mechanism: Judicial Review of Military Activities 
Historically, the military justice system was completely outside the purview of the 
regular justice system in Nepal. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990, had 
exempted the Supreme Court from reviewing cases of court martial. However, the interim 
Constitution of 2007 brought any case of murder or rape by military personnel under the 
jurisdiction of regular courts. Nepal police are to conduct the criminal investigation if any 
military personnel are charged with rape or murder. Consequently, the military justice 
system is brought under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.193 
6. Maoist-Led Government: Nadir of CMR 
In 2009, Prime Minister Puspa Kamal Dahal, leader of the Maoist party, resigned 
over the sacking of COAS General Katawal. The Maoists had accused General Katwal of 
defying government orders in three incidents: recruiting some 3000 personnel into the 
army; reinstating eight brigadier generals whom the government had retired; and pulling 
athletes of the army team out of national games to protest the participation of the former 
rebel team of Maoists.194 Although, the Prime Minister sacked the COAS, the Cabinet 
was divided on the decision. In the face of such politically divisive conditions, the 
President annulled the decision and wrote directly to the COAS to continue in office.195 
Constitutionally, the President is the Supreme Commander of the NA and appoints the 
COAS on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers. But controversy erupted 
when he reversed the government decision to sack General Rookmangad Katawal.196  
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On May 3, 2009, the Maoist-led cabinet sacked the incumbent COAS, General 
Rookmangad Katawal, and appointed General Kul Bahadur Khadka as the acting chief of 
the NA. The president, however, was informed of the decision only later on.197 Prior to 
the Maoist Party’s decision to fire the COAS, all major political parties were in favor of 
asserting more civilian control over the armed forces. However, such unilateral action by 
the Maoists created fear among other parties that it was designed to weaken the national 
military to serve their vested interest.198  
Therefore, when the Cabinet decided to sack the COAS, most of the coalition 
government partners were absent or expressed their disagreement, instead they asked the 
President to get involved. Moreover, 18 political parties represented in the CA, including 
those in the government, wrote to the President requesting him to intervene. General 
Katawal also petitioned the President to reinstate him, arguing he had been sacked 
contrary to the provisions of the constitution. It was under such conditions, President 
Yadav, Supreme Commander of the Nepal Army, ordered General Katawal to continue in 
the job since his dismissal was against the constitutional and legal provisions.199 
Prime Minister Dahal resigned on May 4, 2009, since his action to sack Katawal 
did not materialize and the coalition partners withdrew support for his government. He 
alleged the President’s action was “an unconstitutional step against the elected 
government.” He, however, stated that there was “an urgent need to end the dual regime 
created through unconstitutional measures.” Prime Minister Dahal further said he was 
“stepping down in a bid to safeguard democracy, nationalism and the peace process 
which had been endangered due to the conspiracy hatched by opposition parties and 
foreign forces.”200 This is the second time the democratically elected Prime Minister of 
Nepal has resigned due to civil-military friction.  
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7. Ministry of Defense: Weak Institution 
As far as the Ministry of Defense (MOD) is concerned, modern Nepal never had a 
functioning MOD. Since the beginning of Panchayat era in 1960 to up until 2006, 
although there was a provision for MOD, the real power and responsibilities of 
controlling the military were vested in the Principal Military Secretariat at the Royal 
Palace. However, when the monarchy was suspended in 2006, many of these powers and 
responsibilities were effectively shifted from the Royal Palace to the Army Headquarters 
instead of the MOD. The Chief of Army Staff reported to Defense Minister only for the 
sake of formality, but retained the actual decision making authority himself.201 
Throughout Nepal’s modern history, the MOD has remained virtually dysfunctional. In 
2011, Nepal’s government initiated a plan to overhaul the MOD to establish civilian 
oversight of the NA. The plan aimed to restructure the old organization of the MOD 
since1992. There are only 38 all-civilian staffs in the MOD, who struggle to manage 
almost a 95,000-strong army. Although the plan envisages an increase in the number of 
staff to 98 civilian personnel with the inclusion of new special sections such as a human 
rights cell, procurement of military hardware, and oversight of the peacekeeping 
operations. However, due to lack of expert manpower and access to data of the Army 
Headquarters, the Ministry is working as a rubber stamp only.202 As the only service 
under the resource-crunched MOD, the NA has remained largely autonomous. Thus, the 
civilian oversight of the military by such a weak MOD is questionable.  
Differences between the Maoist Minister of Defense and the Army Chief, 
Katawal, deepened when the army continued to recruit the vacant posts of the NA and 
extended the tenure of the retired generals despite the objection of the MOD. Thus, when 
the Maoist Defense Minister tried to assert authority, the NA’s relation with the Ministry 
became rather frosty. In spite of its constitutional rights the MOD has not been able to 
assert its authority over the military.203 The failure of the democratic institutions such as 
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political parties, MOD, and executives to gain the confidence of the military might spur 
the NA in the direction of asserting political power on its own.204   On February 15, 2009, 
NA submitted a political proposal to the National Interest Preservation Committee of the 
CA demanding revocation of democratization of NA, secularization of state, and creation 
of a federal structure.205 The NA even went on to suggest that such matters should be 
endorsed only through a referendum.206 Events, as such, indicate the possibility of NA 
having greater political aspirations. 
8. Integration of Maoist Combatants:  Stabilizing CMR 
Ever since the fiasco of the Maoist-led government’s attempt to sack the COAS, 
the CMR in Nepal has gradually improved. Successful integration of the Maoist 
combatants into the NA was a significantly visible indicator of positive civil-military 
relations. The NA proposed a relatively liberal plan to integrate interested Maoist 
combatants into the national armed forces under a separate directorate, which was taken 
positively by all major political parties.207 Presentation of insignia of rank to the former 
Maoist combatant officers-cadet on August 26, 2013, concluded the integration of the 
Maoist combatants into the NA.208 Of 19,602 verified Maoist combatants, only 17,076 
combatants showed up for the regrouping process in the cantonments. Out of these, 1,460 
combatants were qualified for military training for integration into the NA, six opted for 
the rehabilitation program, and the remainder took up voluntary retirement with a state-
offered cash package of Nepalese Rs. 500,000 to 800,000, depending upon the rank of the 
combatants.209 Of the total trainees 66 men and four women combatants were 
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commissioned into the NA as officers, and 1,352 of them joined the NA as soldiers in 
July 2013.210  
F. ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ON CMR 
(2006‒2012) 
India, China, and the U.S. had adopted a different approach to the Maoist problem 
in Nepal. However, during the popular democratic movement of 2006, all three countries’ 
interests converged as they saw the movement was feeding a growing Maoist rebellion 
and a threat of Maoist victory loomed large. Thus, in a strikingly unprecedented manner 
an unusual diplomatic alliance was formed among Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi, 
which collectively put pressure on the King to step down.211 Five days after several 
ambassadors met with the King in succession with a common message to step aside, the 
King announced the reinstatement of Parliament. All three countries provided vital 
support in the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006 and subsequent 
election of the CA in 2008. Such a convergence of interests was also instrumental in 
convincing the NA to accept the CPA and render assistance toward a successful election. 
Such a remarkable example of convergence of strategic interests among often 
competing nations could not last long. When the Maoist government sacked the Chief of 
the Army Staff in May 2009, allegedly for his defiance of the government, the interests of 
the three countries once again diverged. This divergence of interests led to the nadir of 
CMR in Nepal.  
India flexed its political leverage to revoke the decision when the Maoist Prime 
Minister sacked the COAS. The relationship between India and the Maoist had already 
been estranged when the Prime Minister made his first foreign visit to China as opposed 
to the tradition of visiting India first. India was unhappy with the affiliation of the Maoist 
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party with China. To make the matter worse, the Maoists went ahead to sack the COAS 
crossing the red line drawn by India not to touch the NA. It is believed that India’s 
promise to keep the NA intact was a quid pro quo for the NA’s support to the peace 
process.212 Many non-Maoist groups interested in Nepal’s affairs considered the sacking 
of the Chief of NA as the Maoists’ move to take control of the state by weakening the 
only strong institution of Nepal. Thus, the Indian establishment persuaded the President 
to revoke the decision and encouraged the United Marxist Leninist party to withdraw 
support from the government.  
The U.S. was also unhappy with the Maoists coming into power so early. It 
claimed that the Maoists were yet to prove that they would abide by the commitment to a 
multiparty democracy. With such a background when the Maoist-led government sacked 
the chief of the army, the U.S. became suspicious of the Maoists’ motives. The continued 
presence of a strong NA served the U.S. and Indian interests to keep it as a strong bastion 
to counterbalance any undesirable Maoist takeover of the country.  
On the other hand, China was in search of a stable political partner in Nepal and 
had started a courtship with the Maoist Party. However, it did not lend support to the 
Maoists at the cost of breaking relations with NA. Thus, despite political support for the 
Maoists, China did not come out to support their move. 
The debacle of the Maoist-NA was clearly an issue of civil-military relations. 
Under the ideal conditions and principle of democratic civil military relations, the 
legitimate government has the right to make such decisions. However, in the present case, 
the divergent interests of various internal and external powers took the side of the 
military in the civil-military conflict. The study thus reveals that such differential 
assistance has had a far-reaching impact on the relations between the military and the 
civilian government. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
As Nepal went through a sea of political changes since 1990, CMR also came to 
the lime light. Nepal’s democratic CMR can be understood best by dividing it into two 
distinct time periods from 1990 to 2005 and from 2006 to 2012. The first period 
illustrates Nepal’s practice of multiparty democracy with a constitutional monarchy, and 
the second period represents the Republic of Nepal with a multiparty democracy. In both 
periods, despite attempts made to bring the NA under civilian control by adopting 
constitutional measures, NA has prevailed over the civilian government whenever there 
was a friction in the civil-military relations. Therefore, it is important to understand the 
background of the discourses of CMR in democratizing Nepal to assess the causes of 
continuous civil-military friction. 
The late King Mahendra consolidated military-monarch relations with the 
adoption of the Act on The Rights, Duty, Function and Terms of the Service of the 
Commander-in-Chief (1969), which made the COAS responsible and accountable to the 
monarch rather than to the government.213 As this act remained unchanged until 2006, 
despite the constitutional arrangements of asserting civilian control over the military 
through the provision of NDC, the NA remained absolutely loyal to the monarch and 
prevailed over the civilian leadership during the times of civil-military friction.  
Even after restoration of the multiparty democracy in 1990, owing to historical 
links between the monarch and the military, the politicians largely left the military to be 
autonomous. Since the King was supreme commander of the NA and he held the final 
authority to operate and use the armed forces on the recommendation of the NDC, he was 
able to exploit the weaknesses of the Constitution by using his discretionary authority.214 
The ruling elites in Nepal after 1990 did not feel any necessity to bring the then Royal 
Nepal Army and other security mechanisms under civilian control. If the elected 
government had designed and implemented a plan for security sector reform, particularly 
focusing on the NA, the traditional power of the monarchy would have been curtailed. As 
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a result of the failure of the ruling elites to democratically control the armed forces, the 
NA remained loyal to the King until 2006, but not to the elected governments.215  
As the NA was deployed against the Maoists, India, China, and the U.S. provided 
military assistance according to their interests. Such support was motivated by their 
desire to fulfill their own divergent interests and led to worsening CMR as it allowed the 
King to take over power. By contrast, during the popular movement of 2006, the 
convergence of interests of foreign powers led to the peaceful reinstatement of 
Parliament. The 2009 debacle over the sacking of the COAS proves that merely having 
constitutional provisions does not ensure stable CMR. The latest debacle also suggests 
that in spite of all the necessary provisions to bring the military under the democratic 
control, the government failed to achieve political consensus on retaining civilian 
supremacy due to the involvement of foreign hands. Thus, the study reveals that foreign 
assistance driven by diverse interests cause complexities in civil-military relations, as the 
military becomes more powerful in relation to other traditional institutions. 
NA has already proved its commitments to remain under the control of the 
democratically elected civilian government by peacefully supporting the transition to a 
republic, rendering necessary assistance to the election of the CA, and accepting Maoist 
combatants to be integrated into the army.216 However, what remains to be seen is how 
efficiently the political masters control the army without damaging NA’s effectiveness. 
Nonetheless, harmonious civil-military relations are evolutionary and a long-term 
process. Therefore, it cannot be imposed by any political decision.  
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis examined a case study of foreign assistance from Nepal’s three most 
important donors—India, China, and the U.S. In particular, it examined the dynamics of 
democratic civil-military relations in two distinct periods: the period from 1990‒2005, 
when Nepal transformed into a multiparty democracy with constitutional monarchy, and 
the second period, from 2006‒2012, when Nepal transformed to a federal democratic 
republic, and the CA was dissolved in 2012 because it failed to promulgate the new 
constitution within the mandated time.  
Nepal’s civil-military relations cannot be solely  attributed to domestic political 
interplay, but foreign assistance from external powers also strongly shaped civil-military 
relations. Divergent foreign assistance, guided mainly by the donor’s geo-strategic and 
political interests has complicated civil-military relations in Nepal. Since 1990, when 
Nepal first undertook its quest for democracy, democratic CMR have remained 
comparatively unstable because the military has remained powerful due to foreign 
security assistance compared to other traditional institutions. Although  many issues 
behind the lack of consolidation are domestic, analysts must also look at the role of 
foreign security assistance in this process. 
Nepal’s strategic location makes its neighbors and one global power, the U.S., 
compete for influence and power. As a buffer state between India and China, each of 
these countries wants to bring Nepal under its sphere of influence to further its own 
security interests. Given Nepal’s size and location, its powerful neighbors have a 
dominant say in its security and foreign affairs. As long as these forces continue to 
compete in extending their power and influence in the region, Nepal will continue to face 
the implications of this competition. 
Being a poor and underdeveloped country, Nepal receives a significant amount of 
foreign assistance. However, donor countries are often motivated by their own vested 
interests; consequently, one sees different results from similar kinds of assistance. 
Nepal’s three important donors, India, China, and the U.S., not only have different 
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interests in providing assistance to Nepal, but these interests are often at odds and can 
come in various forms, such as military, economic, or political. Keeping Nepal friendly 
to India in the area of security and minimizing Chinese influence has been a primary 
objective of India’s Nepal policy. On the other hand, minimizing Nepal’s dependence 
upon India and keeping Nepal as a strong independent neutral buffer has been an 
important Chinese objective. Since Nepal is a buffer state situated strategically between 
the two rising regional powers, the U.S. also desires to play an important role in the 
security affairs of the country. 
Nepal’s geo-political setting presents an example wherein political parties as well 
as the military share a strong affiliation with external players. Owing to Nepal’s 
underdevelopment and political instability, foreign assistance, as well as foreign pressure, 
plays a vital role. Nepal’s various political parties have been known to have closer 
relations with one or the other friendly donor countries. For instance, the Nepali Congress 
Party is known to have been pro-Indian, and some factions of it are claimed to be more 
inclined toward the U.S. Likewise, after the first election of CA in 2008,  the United 
Communist Party of Nepal Maoists-UCPN (M) has become closer to China. The Nepal 
Army, on the other hand, shares close relations with all three countries. It is often under 
conditions of such interwoven relationships that Nepal’s CMR becomes unstable, 
depending upon the government of the time and the interest of the foreign powers. 
Diverse foreign security assistance to Nepal brings another issue of donor 
interests and approaches for providing assistance. All three donor countries have 
divergent interests in assisting the Nepal Army, and this diverse form of military 
assistance has an unintended consequence of unbalancing the civil military relations. 
Although all three of the donors consider NA as the last bastion of stability in Nepal, that 
stability has different meanings for each of the three major donors analyzed here.  
For India, a stable Nepal is the one where the ruling government willingly 
recognizes the ‘special relations’ between Nepal and India, a government that is sensitive 
to India’s security concerns vis-à-vis China and Pakistan, and is willing to place  Nepal 
under India’s sphere of influence. China, on the other side, prioritizes stability over 
ideology and is willing to work with any Nepali government as long as it accepts the ‘one 
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China policy’ in relation to Tibet, and a government that is willing to use its security 
apparatus to restrain the activities of Tibetan dissidents. As for the U.S., stability in Nepal 
means having a democratic government which governs through a rule of law, respects the 
human rights of its citizens, and looks to Western values positively.  
Such diverse interests have two consequences. First, depending upon the situation 
and foreign inclination of the government of the time, external forces try to use or exploit 
both the army and political leaders to safeguard their interests. Second, as all donors vie 
to render support to the military, thereby they inherently become more influential and 
earn a distinct place in the politics of Nepal. Such a strong position sometimes can 
challenge the legitimately elected government.  
For instance, in 2001, when the Nepal Army got involved in the counter 
insurgency operations after the Maoists attack, military assistance started pouring in 
Nepal. India and the U.S. declared Maoists as terrorists and provided significant military 
assistance to the NA. India supported with the supply of both lethal and non-lethal 
weapons including small arms, ammunitions, mine protective vehicles, and helicopters. 
As part of the “War on Terror,” Nepal and the U.S. signed an Antiterrorism Assistance 
Deal, and the U.S. provided small arms, ammunitions, and counter insurgency training to 
NA. As Kathmandu was getting increasing foreign military support, Beijing also 
provided financial and military aid to NA. In 2005, China was the only country that 
supplied arms, ammunition, and financial aid to Nepal during King Gyanendra’s direct 
rule when other had suspended support.  
Along with the increase in foreign security assistance and various kinds of 
political support, the issue of civil-military relations also surfaced. The military 
assistance from the donors boosted the confidence of the King and the army to solve the 
Maoist’s problem militarily. Thus, the King asserted a more active role and began to 
accumulate power in his own hands. As the country became increasingly militarized, the 
political parties were systematically marginalized. Consequently, civil-military relations 
also deteriorated.  
 66
In spite of the early warning of derailing democracy, the U.S. and India gave 
priority to stability over democracy and continued to provide support to the NA. By the 
time these donors realized the extent of the imbalance, CMR in Nepal had been greatly 
damaged. When India and the U.S. suspended military assistance to Nepal in protest of 
the royal regime, China provided security assistance to Nepal at the King’s request. 
China had long maintained good relations with the monarchy. Although the monarchy 
was antithetical to Chinese ideology, China viewed the monarchy as a reliable force to 
defend its security interest in Nepal. Thus, China seized the opportunity to make inroads 
into Nepal through military aid, and the royal regime found backing from a foreign 
power.  
In the period from 2006‒2012, the most striking civil-military friction was the 
fiasco over the sacking of COAS by the Maoist-led government. India used its political 
leverage to bring down the Maoist-led government over the issue of the sacking of 
COAS, and the U.S. quietly supported the action of the Indian establishment. The 
relationship between India and the Maoists had already been estranged due to the latter’s 
growing affiliation towards China. Many non-Maoist groups interested in the affairs of 
Nepal looked at the incident as the Maoists’ deliberate attempt to weaken the national 
army and ultimately take over the state. Thus, the Indian establishment persuaded the 
President to revoke the decision and encouraged the United Marxist Leninist Party to 
withdraw support from the government. The U.S. also gave its tacit support for the Indian 
effort, although it was against the ideal principle of civilian control of the military. On the 
other hand, China had started a courtship with the Maoists after they came to power. 
Some analysts believe that new ties with China encouraged the Maoists party to take such 
radical steps to fire the COAS. The Maoists party might have assumed the support of 
China as a counterweight to Indian pressure, but it is hard to accept that China would 
lend support to the Maoists at the cost of relations with the NA. China also sees the NA 
as the last bastion of stability in Nepal recommendations 
This study makes two policy recommendations to build positive democratic civil-
military relations through foreign assistance. First, donors need to help the military 
professionalize and the best way to start this is from restructuring the MOD. Since MOD 
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is the highest authority that makes security related policies, it should be staffed with a 
sufficient number of highly professional personnel. In the absence of an effective MOD, 
the military becomes autonomous, which in a democracy can threaten the government.  
Second, keeping the army under civilian control is the essence of democratic 
civil-military relations. Many officers of the NA are exposed to democratic civil-military 
relations when undergoing professional military education in democratic countries. 
However, civilian leaders of Nepal lacked direct experience with defense matters and 
thus a gap in understanding exists between the military and civilian leadership. To fill the 
knowledge gap, in addition to the military leadership, lawmakers should also attend 
various trainings or seminars related to military and their relations as part of the foreign 
assistance. It is important that a civilian leadership is well versed in military matters to 
lead a professional military organization. Thus, security assistance should focus on 
educating politicians how to organize and manage the military more efficiently and 
transparently. In addition, they should be educated on the aspects of positive civilian 
oversight and civilian control of the budget. 
Foreign powers supporting democratization need to supply more than just money 
and arms; they need to provide positive and practical models for civilian control of the 
military. When these powers supply weapons and military equipment, they often provide 
training in how to use these tools. Similarly, when they want to help the country to 
achieve democracy and stability, they should also consider providing civilian and military 
leadership with sufficient training to use the techniques and procedures of promoting 
democratic civil-military relations.  
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